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Foreword 
This Staff Working Paper presents the results of research undertaken in the 
Productivity Commission’s Environment and Resource Economics Branch 
during 2005. It is part of a larger suite of water policy research conducted by the 
Commission, including modelling of regional economic impacts of changes in water 
trade within the southern Murray–Darling Basin. 
In December 2005, the Productivity Commission was asked by the Australian 
Government to undertake a major research study to assist implementation of the 
National Water Initiative. ‘Rural Water Use and the Environment: the Role of 
Market Mechanisms’ will focus on water use efficiency and the feasibility of market 
mechanisms to address water-related environmental externalities (see 
www.pc.gov.au).  
The Productivity Commission is releasing this Staff Working Paper as a 
complement to the new commissioned research study, to help inform public input 
into the ongoing investigation. The paper discusses the nature and causes of 
environmental change related to rural water use, and provides a taxonomy of the 
many diverse types. It also examines the possible role of a charge imposed by rural 
water utilities in managing externalities that may emerge.  
Any feedback on this research will be considered in the context of the 
commissioned research study. However, the Staff Working Paper should not be 
seen as necessarily foreshadowing or circumscribing the Productivity Commission’s 
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Abbreviations 
ARMCANZ   Agricultural and Resource Management Council of Australia 
and New Zealand  
COAG  Council of Australian Governments 
EC  electrical conductivity (a measure of salinity) 
NCC  National Competition Council  
NCP   National Competition Policy 
PC Productivity  Commission 
Water CEOs Group   Water Chief Executive Officers Group 
Explanations 
Billion  The convention used for a billion is a thousand million (109).
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9) litres.  
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•  Externalities associated with irrigation water supply and use are complex and the 
links between these sources of environmental change and their effects are not 
always well understood or measured.  
•  Many factors influence the extent to which a charge or tax on water use would 
actually change water use, including the volume of water available to irrigators, the 
extent to which trade can occur, the size of the tax, the price responsiveness for 
irrigation water, and the existing mechanisms to address externalities.  
–  Where there is water trade and where restrictions on water allocations result in 
scarcity rents, a charge will only reduce water use (and consequent environmental 
costs) if it exceeds the scarcity rents. If water use does not change, there will be 
no short run improvement in economic efficiency from such a charge, although it 
might encourage long run efficiency improvements.  
–  Scarcity rents will vary within and between irrigation seasons, as well as between 
irrigation districts. 
•  When assessing new policies to manage environmental externalities, care should be 
taken to define adequately the externality, and not simply identify instances of 
environmental change. Governments should carefully consider the potential benefits 
and costs in assessing such new policies.  
•  An externality tax can make the costs of negative externalities transparent and 
provide incentives to some relevant economic agents. A tax equal to the marginal 
external costs at each level of output can improve efficiency and in the longer term 
may provide an incentive to undertake abatement activities.  
•  A tax on water use may increase economic efficiency where external costs are 
related only to the level of water use. But such a tax is an unsuitable instrument if the 
government’s policy objective is to reduce environmental damage to a pre-
determined level or to raise a target level of revenue to address the externalities.  
•  Challenges in considering and implementing an externality tax include whether such 
a tax is appropriate for a particular externality, variations in efficiency benefits, 
interaction with other externalities, difficulties in determining the rate, use of the 
revenue and legal feasibility. 
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Overview 
Key elements of the Council of Australian Government’s 1994 strategic framework 
for water reform were consumption based pricing and full cost recovery. In 1998, to 
assist implementation of the water reforms, the former Agricultural and Resource 
Management Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ) endorsed 
guidelines for water pricing, including that water businesses should recover, among 
other costs, the costs of managing externalities. But there is confusion on the 
meaning of ‘externalities’, with some agencies and policy documents (including the 
National Water Initiative) appearing to adopt a cost recovery definition (recovering 
the environmental and natural resource management costs incurred by water 
businesses). Others (such as the High Level Steering Group on Water) use the 
economic definition of externalities (those side effects or spillovers of an activity 
that are not taken into account in an individual’s or business’ decision and that 
affect another party’s wellbeing).  
This Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper examines the extent to which 
charges imposed by irrigation water utilities can address externalities from 
irrigation water supply and use. It also develops a framework to identify and 
characterise changes in environmental conditions from the supply and use of 
irrigation water that may lead to environmental externalities.  
Irrigation water use in Australia 
Irrigated agriculture represents about 28 per cent of the gross value of agricultural 
production in Australia. Irrigation water is used to supplement rainfall in 
agricultural production systems. Agriculture accounts for about 67 per cent of all 
extracted water used in Australia, with most of the water used by Australian 
agriculture in New South Wales (44 per cent in 2000-01), Victoria (22 per cent) and 
Queensland (21 per cent).  
Water utilities charge irrigators for the water allocated and/or delivered to farms. In 
addition to purchasing water from utilities, irrigators can trade entitlements 
(irrigators’ access rights to a specific quantity of water each irrigation season, 
sometimes referred to as ‘permanent trade’) and seasonal allocations (the proportion 
of water entitlements allocated by water utilities during an irrigation season, 
sometimes referred to as ‘temporary trade’). A variety of constraints limit the extent     




of the trade — in general, trade is less constrained within irrigation districts than 
between districts, and trade in seasonal allocations is less constrained than trade in 
entitlements. Differences can exist between utility charges and the traded price of 
irrigation water, representing scarcity rents accruing to some irrigators. These rents 
can be large, but vary over time and between regions.  
Distinguishing environmental change from externalities 
Many different environmental changes are associated with the supply and use of 
irrigation water, such as changes to hydrological conditions, habitat, water quality 
and ecological conditions. These changes can occur at each stage in the irrigation 
water supply and use chain covering harvesting, extraction, storage, diversion, 
delivery and use.  
Often these environmental changes are associated with externalities (defined in 
economic terms). However, the occurrence of environmental change does not 
necessarily mean an environmental externality exists. An economic externality 
requires both the environmental change and a human reaction to that change. Thus, 
if there is environmental change that the community does not value (either 
positively or negatively), then an economic externality does not exist.  
Not all externalities require public policy responses, whether by way of general 
legislation, regulation, pricing rules or case-by-case responses. The criterion is: 
‘would the expected benefits of action to reduce the externality exceed the expected 
costs of that action?’ (where the benefits and costs are summed up across all 
affected individuals and communities). In general, it is unlikely that a complete 
elimination of an externality — reducing the spillover to zero — would satisfy this 
test.  
The framework developed in this paper for analysing the characteristics of 
externalities incorporates three salient elements of an externality: its source(s), how 
it is transmitted and its effects (table 1). The characteristics of an externality affect 
the likelihood of private sector solutions being successfully undertaken, and 
influence the effectiveness of policy instruments.  
Possible water supply externalities include alterations to river flows, cold water 
releases from dams and obstructions to fish passage. Possible water use externalities 
include waterlogging, land salinisation and downstream salinity. Many of the 
externalities associated with irrigation water supply and use are complex and the 
links between sources and effects are not well understood. At times, it is difficult to 
identify, observe and measure effects from individual sources, and resulting 
changes in environmental conditions.      
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Different parties can be positively and/or negatively affected by changes to 
environmental conditions caused by irrigation water supply and use in different 
ways. Environmental externalities can affect the productivity of industries that 
require water or land in their production processes. Domestic users can be affected 
through impacts on health or household infrastructure. Individuals (who may also 
be producers) can also be affected if they value water and land for recreational, 
indigenous, cultural and heritage reasons, or for the ecosystem services, species and 
habitat they provide. 
Table 1  Framework for analysing the characteristics of 
externalities 




Can the sources be 
identified? 
Can the activities of each 
source be observed? 
Do activities other than 
irrigation supply and use 
result in the externality? 
Can the environmental 
changes caused by 
each source be 
observed and 
measured? 
Can those who are 
affected be identified? 





Where are the source(s) 
located? Are they 
geographically diffuse? 
Do many sources 
contribute to the same 
effect? 
Are the source(s) and 
effect(s) in a different 
location? 
Do the relationships 
between sources and 
effects change with 
location? 
Where are the effects 
located? Are they 
geographically diffuse? 
Are many effects 
attributable to an 
individual source?  
Temporal 
variation 
To what extent do past 
activities have current (or 
future) effects? 
Are activities affected by 
the natural variability of 
ecosystems and 
ecosystem processes? 
Are there time lags 
between source and 




between sources and 
effects affected by 
natural variability? 
Can effects be 
apportioned between 
past and ongoing 
activities? 







What is the nature of the relationships between sources and effects — for 
example, linear, increasing, decreasing, with threshold effects? 
Are the changes reversible or do they display hysteresis (whereby the nature 
of the relationship between two variables depends on whether the variables 
are increasing or decreasing)? 
Is there uncertainty about the relationship between (observable) activities and 
changes to environmental conditions? Is there uncertainty about the relation 
between changes to environmental conditions and effects?     





If private action fails to address an externality adequately, there may be a role for 
government intervention. However, the presence of an externality does not 
necessarily imply a case for government intervention. Addressing a market failure 
might not improve the allocation of resources, when account is taken of the costs of 
government action (such as the costs of policy development, administration, 
monitoring, enforcement and compliance). Governments should only intervene 
where the benefits from intervening are expected to outweigh the costs.  
If there is a sufficient case for government intervention, a range of options is 
available — including using or creating markets, regulation and education and 
information. One approach is through the use of so called ‘price instruments’ such 
as taxes, charges or subsidies. An alternative approach is to use regulation to restrict 
the level of outputs or inputs (‘quantity based instruments’). Price and quantity 
based instruments and the ability to trade can facilitate the market determining an 
efficient allocation of resources. There is no a priori reason to favour either price or 
quantity based instruments: the selection of instrument depends on a number of 
factors.  
Important principles for assessing the use of policy instruments are appropriateness 
(is government intervention warranted; is the goal worth achieving?), effectiveness 
(does the policy achieve the stated objectives?), efficiency (does the policy achieve 
the highest net benefit of all alternative policies?) and equity (is the distribution of 
costs and benefits ‘fair’). In designing and assessing policy instruments to manage 
environmental externalities associated with the irrigation industry, the aim should 
be to ‘internalise’ an appropriate level of external costs from changing 
environmental conditions. When assessing new policies to manage environmental 
externalities, care should be taken to define adequately the externality, and not 
simply identify instances of environmental change.  
Effects of an externality charge or tax 
An externality charge or tax can be used to ensure the costs of negative externalities 
are transparent and provide appropriate incentives to economic agents (similarly, a 
subsidy can ensure the benefits of positive externalities are included in private 
decision making). Such a charge (or corrective tax) on water use (that is, an addition 
to existing utility charges) has been proposed as one way to address environmental 
externalities from water harvest, storage, delivery and use.  
An optimal (or properly calibrated) Pigouvian tax schedule (after the British 
economist, A.C. Pigou) would be equal to the marginal external cost at each level of     
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the various associated activities (not only their current level). Introducing such a tax 
can improve efficiency (by equating the marginal private benefit with the marginal 
external cost of the activity) and provide the correct incentive to undertake 
abatement activities. However, there may be policy options superior to Pigouvian 
taxation schemes (that is, produce larger aggregate economic benefit).  
An optimal Pigouvian tax schedule would signal the marginal social cost of water  
for all relevant levels of water use. Irrigators then decide how much water to use. 
The resultant environmental change is the optimal externality. There is no necessary 
connection between the tax revenue so raised, and the optimal level of public 
expenditure on abating the environmental change. 
To devise the optimal Pigovian tax schedule, information is required about the 
marginal external damage caused at relevant levels of water use. If information is 
available only at one or a limited number of levels of water use, then governments 
could apply a simpler tax schedule (for example, a tax per unit of water use, 
regardless of volume). Alternatively, on some other basis, governments may set a 
target for the reduction in the environmental effect, to be achieved by the use of 
regulation, rather than taxation, or by some combination. 
Issues in implementing an externality tax on water use 
The extent to which a tax changes water use depends on many factors, including the 
size of the tax, the effect of the tax on the price of water, the price responsiveness of 
irrigation water use, the volume of water initially allocated to irrigators, the extent 
to which trade can occur, and existing mechanisms to address externalities. 
A tax when there is no trade 
When there is no trade, responses by irrigators are likely to be small or zero unless 
the charge is very high. If irrigators are significantly constrained by the size of their 
allocation (and so use their full allocation), a small charge is unlikely to change 
their water use. A green tea farmer, for example, could face a reduction in profit if 
using even marginally less water significantly reduces the quality of their crop. This 
irrigator is likely to continue to demand the same amount of water from utilities to 
meet the quality standards — despite the externality charge — except in very wet 
seasons. Charges that are high enough to influence water use may involve 
significant adjustment costs.      




A tax when there is water trade 
When there is water trade, and where restrictions on water allocations result in 
scarcity rents (such as in the southern Murray–Darling Basin), a Pigouvian tax on 
the use of irrigation water will ensure that the external costs of water use are 
transparent. But, just as in the previous case, an optimal tax would only change the 
quantity of water used (and therefore the level of environmental externalities) if the 
tax exceeds the scarcity rents. Further, if water use does not change, there will also 
be no short run improvement in economic efficiency from introducing the tax 
(although the tax itself is an efficient way of raising government revenue).  
Nonetheless, efficiency might still improve in the longer term. Irrigators might 
undertake abatement activities where these cost less than the tax saved, and if they 
expect the level of tax in the future to adapt to the reduced negative externalities 
from the abatement activities.  
Other issues in designing an externality tax 
Challenges in deciding whether to implement an externality tax, and in designing 
such a tax, include (apart from the issue just discussed):  
•  whether such a tax is appropriate for a particular externality 
•  variation in efficiency benefits 
•  potential interaction with other externalities 
•  difficulties in determining the rate of such a tax 
•  use of the tax revenue 
•  legal feasibility.  
A tax on water use may be an appropriate policy tool for some, but not all 
externalities. A tax used to signal the marginal social cost of the activity creating the 
externality is suited to externalities where the external costs are related to the level 
of the taxed activity (that is, those imposing marginal costs for each unit of output). 
Where the link between the activity causing the externality and the external costs is 
weak, the tax may fail to induce those undertaking the activity to change their 
behaviour, and might create further market distortions. Thus, a tax on water use can 
be suitable for addressing externalities of irrigation water supply and use, such as 
instream salinity. Other externalities, such as obstructions to fish migration, can 
create an externality with their existence, regardless of the level of water use; a 
volumetric tax on water use is not well suited to addressing such externalities. 
Therefore, understanding the features of environmental externalities is important     
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when considering whether they are affected by changes in irrigation water use and 
consequently suited to a tax on water use.  
The efficiency benefits from introducing a tax can also vary with circumstances. 
Existing policy responses to deal with externalities (such as quantity restrictions) 
might already have achieved some of the potential efficiency gains of a tax (thus 
reducing the benefits of introducing a tax). Nonetheless, short term efficiency 
benefits along with potential longer term efficiency benefits might still make it 
worthwhile in some circumstances to introduce a tax.  
A tax on water use might also influence externalities other than those it was 
designed to address. At times, water losses from the conveyance of irrigation water, 
for example, may benefit local producers and the functioning of natural ecosystems. 
The use of an externality tax may lead to reduced irrigation and so reduce these 
positive effects. Further, the use of an externality tax may also lead to unintended 
behaviour, such as excess pumping of groundwater and the installation of farm 
dams to capture surface runoff before it enters river and groundwater systems. 
These responses could have a detrimental effect on river flows, the environment and 
in the longer term, production. The potential for unintended side-effects of policy is 
not unique to taxes. 
Determining the optimal rate of a tax for irrigation externalities would be difficult. 
In Australia, there appear to be few studies that would provide policy makers with 
estimates of the likely marginal costs of externalities to set a tax. An ideal tax (a 
Pigouvian tax) would need differing rates across different locations and times, to 
reflect the varying costs of externalities over location and time. Such an approach 
would be costly to design and implement. Nonetheless, introducing a 
quasi-Pigouvian tax set below the optimum level will likely improve efficiency, 
with the marginal improvements in efficiency decreasing as the tax rate approaches 
the optimum level. Thus, one strategy might be to implement such a tax at an 
approximate, but conservative, level. In the future, as information improves on the 
likely marginal costs of externalities, the tax rate could be revised.  
If a tax were imposed, a significant issue is how the collected revenue should be 
spent. Allocating such revenue to address environmental problems associated with 
the externality would require careful consideration. The revenue raised might be 
higher (or lower) than the optimal level of expenditure on remedying and/or 
preventing environmental damage. Nonetheless, using the revenue to address the 
externality may make such a tax more acceptable to the community.  
The legal feasibility of an externality charge would require examination. An 
externality charge is a tax imposed on an input to production and hence it could be 
considered an excise duty. However, under Section 90 of the Australian     




Constitution, excise duties cannot legally be imposed by the States and Territories 
— only the Australian Government may impose them. Further, under section 51(ii), 
taxes must not generally discriminate between States or parts of States. Any 
differentiation of an externality charge or tax would have to be clearly based on 
differences in environmental conditions that result in different environmental effects 
from the taxed activity. 
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1 Introduction 
A key element of the 1994 Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) strategic 
framework for water reform was water pricing based on the principles of 
consumption based pricing and full cost recovery. In 1998, the former Agricultural 
and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ) 
provided guidance on water pricing, including that water businesses should recover 
the costs of managing externalities. 
Between 1995 and 2004, the National Competition Council (NCC) was responsible 
for assessing State and Territory progress with water reform under the National 
Competition Policy (NCP). From 2005, the recently established National Water 
Commission will assess progress with the entire water reform program. This 
Productivity Commission staff working paper examines the extent to which charges 
imposed by irrigation water utilities can address externalities from irrigation water 
supply and use. 
1.1  Irrigation water use in Australia 
Irrigated agriculture represents about 28 per cent of the gross value of agricultural 
production in Australia. Approximately 2.5 million hectares of land were irrigated 
in 2001-02, a 22 per cent increase since 1996-97 (ABS 2004). Irrigation water is 
used to supplement rainfall in agricultural production systems.  
Agriculture accounts for about 67 per cent of all water used in Australia (table 1.1). 
There is significant variation in the proportion of water consumed by agriculture 
across jurisdictions, ranging from about 40 per cent in Western Australia, to 79 per 
cent in South Australia. Most of the water used by Australian agriculture is used in 
New South Wales (44 per cent), Victoria (22 per cent) and Queensland (21 per 
cent).  
The major agricultural water users include the livestock, pasture and grain 
industries (accounting for 33 per cent of water use in agriculture); the cotton and 
dairy farming industries (17 per cent each) and the rice industry (12 per cent). The 
sugar and horticultural (vegetables, fruit, nuts and grapes) industries are also 
significant users.      




Table 1.1  Total water usea for selected industries, 2000-01 
Gigalitres 
 NSW–ACT  Vic  Qld  SA  WA  Tas  NT  Aust 
Livestock, pasture, grains 
and other agriculture 
2 590  1 435  779  474  176  85  30  5 568 
Dairy farming  401  1 685  288  320  65  76  –  2 834 
Vegetables   96  131  103  65  111  49  1  556 
Fruit  214  209  107  161 65 10 36  803 
Grapes 174  238  6  284  23  1  3  729 
Sugar  1  –  1 186  –  124  –  –  1 311 
Cotton   1 921  –  985  –  3  –  –  2 908 
Rice   1 924  27  –  –  –  –  –  1 951 
Total for agricultureb  7 322  3 725  3 454  1 302  565  222  70  16 660 
Total   9 425  7 140  4 711  1 647  1 409  417  160  24 909 
a Total water use = mains water use + self-extracted water use + reuse water. b Columns may not add to total 
because of rounding. – Nil or rounded to zero. 
Source: ABS 2004. 
Irrigators can source irrigation water in a variety of ways, including: 
•  from on-farm diversion and storage of surface water flows 
•  from on-farm pumping and diversion of groundwater 
•  by diverting water from on-farm water courses 
•  via major storage, diversion and delivery infrastructure systems managed by 
public and private utilities (sometimes referred to as supplemented irrigation). 
Most irrigation districts are concentrated in the eastern States of New South Wales, 
Victoria and Queensland, and draw water from Great Dividing Range catchments. 
Over 70 per cent of irrigation use occurs within the Murray–Darling Basin, with 
most supplemented irrigation located within the southern Murray–Darling Basin. In 
many cases, these irrigation districts could not sustain their current farming 
practices without irrigation. 
Within each irrigation district, water utilities deliver water to irrigators 
predominantly via gravity feed delivery systems. During an irrigation season, the 
utilities usually charge irrigators for the water allocated and/or delivered to farms.  
Utility charges are designed primarily to recover the operational, maintenance and 
some capital costs associated with water supply activities, including environmental 
management costs. In most districts, utilities charge irrigators a two-part tariff 
consisting of a fixed component (a charge based on the volume of an irrigator’s 
water entitlement), and a variable component (a charge either on the volume of 
water allocated or the volume delivered during an irrigation season) (Appels,      
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Douglas and Dwyer 2004). The average charge by utilities for irrigation water in 
2001 was an estimated $23.51 per megalitre (ANCID 2002).  
In some areas in Australia, irrigators can trade unused water entitlements (irrigators’ 
access rights to a specific quantity of water each irrigation season, sometimes 
referred to as ‘permanent trade’) and seasonal allocations (the proportion of water 
entitlements allocated by water utilities during an irrigation season sometimes 
referred to as ‘temporary trade’). In the southern Murray–Darling Basin, the market 
price of seasonal allocations often exceeds the utility charges (representing scarcity 
rents). The market price, rather than the utility charge, is the opportunity cost of 
water to the irrigator and the price on which production decisions are made 
(appendix A). Prices for seasonal allocations rose significantly during the recent 
drought, for example, and traded well above utility charges (Appels, Douglas and 
Dwyer 2004). At other times, utility charges may exceed the marginal value and 
traded price of water, for example, during flood periods. When trade in seasonal 
allocations occurs, the seller is responsible for fixed charges related to the traded 
entitlement. In some irrigation areas, water entitlements are to be unbundled into 
components, such as entitlements to access and delivery, that could potentially be 
traded separately. 
Supplying and using water can have a wide range of effects on the environment 
through changes to the hydrology, water quality and ecological conditions 
(chapter 2). There are already many ways in which such effects are being addressed 
(box 1.1), and any new measure would need to take these into account. 
1.2  Water reform in Australia 
The 1994 COAG strategic framework for water reform encompassed economic, 
environmental and social objectives. Key elements of the strategic framework were 
to reform pricing based on the principles of consumption based pricing and full cost 
recovery; to reduce or eliminate cross-subsidies; and to make subsidies transparent. 
The framework also involved the clarification of water property rights, the 
allocation of water to the environment, the adoption of water trading arrangements, 
institutional reform and improved public consultation (NCC 1998). 
In 1995, COAG brought the water reform program under the ambit of the NCP as 
part of a process to accelerate and broaden microeconomic reform. Between 1995 
and 2004, the NCC was responsible for assessing State and Territory governments’ 
progress with NCP reforms (including water). Following its assessment of 
jurisdictions’ progress with NCP reforms, the NCC made recommendations to the 
Australian Government Treasurer on competition payments to States and Territories      




(NCC 2004a). These payments are linked to, among other conditions, the 
implementation of the agreed water reforms (NCC 2001). 
 
Box 1.1  Current approaches for addressing environmental effects 
A variety of policies and instruments directly or indirectly influence the levels and 
distribution of environmental change caused by irrigation water supply and use at the 
local, district and interdistrict levels. These include voluntary responses, education and 
information, regulation and using and creating markets. Examples of current regulatory 
approaches include the following: 
•  Broad government environmental programs and initiatives, such as the National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, the Natural Heritage Trust and The Living 
Murray, are funding vehicles for resource management objectives. They usually 
combine regulation with other approaches. 
•  Water reserved for environmental flows, either through the prescription of 
environmental flows or the allocation of water to the environment. 
•  Natural resource management plans may contain requirements for large capital 
works to mitigate the effects of irrigation salinity. 
•  Jurisdictions usually require utilities to undertake natural resource management 
activities as a condition of their operating requirements. In Victoria, for example, 
rural water authorities are required to meet riparian and instream environmental 
objectives as part of their bulk entitlement order. 
•  Applicants for water rights may be required to prepare farm-level plans for their 
property, to ensure best practice in irrigation and drainage management, water use 
efficiency, and the management of environmental effects. 
There has been limited use of markets for managing environmental effects of irrigation. 
Such approaches can encourage individuals and/or businesses to undertake pollution 
control efforts that are both in their own interests and collectively meet broader policy 
goals (Stavins 2002). These instruments can be more efficient than prescriptive 
regulation because they allow producers to make their own benefit–cost tradeoffs in 
pursuing specific practices. Consequently, they may achieve desired regulatory 
outcomes in least cost ways. A lack of information or high costs associated with market 
creation and participation may outweigh these potential benefits, however. In other 
cases, such as when the environmental outcomes from market based instruments may 
be uncertain, or when environmental thresholds may be breached, the application of 
such instruments will be limited. 
Voluntary approaches to address environmental effects of irrigation water supply and 
use include environmental management systems, codes of practice, and cooperative 
and partnership agreements. The Ricegrowers Association of Australia, for example, 
has a voluntary accreditation program that recognises irrigators for achieving a range 
of environmental management standards. Murray Irrigation undertakes environmental 
activities beyond those required under its operating licence, including a wetland 
watering trial, storm water channel construction, biodiversity education and water 
testing accreditation (Murray Irrigation 2002).  
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In June 2004, the Australian Government and the governments of New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, the ACT and the Northern Territory 
agreed to the National Water Initiative (COAG 2004). Tasmania became a signatory 
to the National Water Initiative in June 2005. As part of this initiative, these 
governments also agreed to establish the National Water Commission to advise 
COAG on national water issues and assist with implementing the water reform 
program, including undertaking the 2005 assessment of States’ and Territories’ 
implementation of NCP water reform commitments (NCC 2004b, pp. 1.3–1.5).  
Guidance on water pricing and externalities 
In 1998, ARMCANZ endorsed guidelines for water pricing, including that water 
businesses should recover the costs of externalities: 
5.  To be viable, a water business should recover, at least, the operational, maintenance 
and administrative costs, externalities, taxes or [tax equivalent regimes] (not 
including income tax), the interest cost on debt, dividends (if any) and make 
provision for future asset refurbishment/replacement ... 
7. In determining prices, transparency is required in the treatment of community 
service obligations, contributed assets, the opening value of assets, externalities 
including resource management costs, and tax equivalent regimes. (NCC 1998, 
pp. 112–13) 
ARMCANZ defined ‘externalities’ in sections 5 and 7 of the guidelines as ‘the 
environmental and natural resource management costs attributable to and incurred 
by the water business’ (NCC 1998, p. 113). The guidelines have in-built flexibility 
by providing a band of prices through which water businesses could achieve full 
cost recovery. Full cost water pricing was to be set within upper and lower bounds, 
with the upper bounds set to avoid monopoly rents and the lower bound set to 
ensure viability. Both bounds were to include costs associated with externalities. 
The ARMCANZ definition of externalities contrasts with economic definitions, 
which view externalities as the side effects or spillovers of an activity that are not 
taken into account in an individual’s or business’ decision to undertake an activity 
and that affect another party’s wellbeing (section 1.3 discusses this issue further). 
In 2000, a High Level Steering Group on Water (comprised of representatives of the 
agriculture and environment agencies of the Australian Government and State 
governments) developed Draft guidelines for managing externalities. The steering 
group proposed a nine step process for managing water externalities and defined 
‘externalities’ as ‘the indirect or accidental consequences of actions associated with 
economic activity’ (High Level Steering Group on Water 2000, p.  6). This 
definition, similar to the economic definition provided above, differs from the cost 
recovery perspective of the ARMCANZ endorsed guidelines.      




The steering group suggested addressing externalities by using a portfolio of tools, 
including property rights, charging, grants and rebates, and standards. It also noted 
that pricing will not always be sufficiently robust, when employed exclusively, to 
carry all the information necessary to manage externality costs effectively (High 
Level Steering Group on Water 2000). 
Perhaps trying to bridge the gap between the definitions of ARMCANZ and the 
guidelines of the High Level Steering Group on Water, the NCC advised: 
The COAG pricing guidelines require externalities to be incorporated into prices. The 
Council recognises that this is a complex and difficult area, particularly in the urban 
sector. The Council views the first step as ensuring prices reflect an appropriate 
proportion of the costs of mitigating environmental problems of water use. The more 
advanced stage is a holistic approach to dealing with externalities, where pricing is only 
one component. (NCC 2002, p. 2.60) 
In 2003, the NCC suggested that ‘the minimum requirement is for the cost of the 
environmental requirements on water businesses to be passed on to water users’ 
(NCC 2003a, p. 7). It also encouraged: 
... all governments to take a broader view of environmental costs when considering 
pricing water supplied outside of irrigation districts than the minimum COAG 
requirement. Taking a broader view, prices should incorporate two aspects of the cost 
of water: the cost of delivering water; and the cost of managing the environmental 
consequences of using water where it is appropriate for these costs to be paid by water 
users. (NCC 2003a, p. 7) [emphasis added] 
The NCC observed, however: 
Because of the uncertainty of environmental impacts and the range of tools that might 
be used to address environmental questions, the Council does not see the water pricing 
guidelines as requiring a particular level of externality charge to be applied to meet full 
cost recovery guidelines. Rather, the obligation is that prices faced by water users 
transparently reflect externalities that are attributable to and incurred by water service 
providers. (NCC 2003b, p. 14) 
It is not clear from the above statements what definition of externalities the NCC 
adopted. Further, the various NCC statements appear to assume equality between 
delivery charges and water prices, but these can differ due to scarcity rents 
(chapter 4). 
Progress with COAG water reforms regarding externalities 
In 2002, a cross-jurisdictional departmental Water Chief Executive Officers Group 
(Water CEOs Group) reported to COAG on progress with water reforms. It 
concluded:      
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… while good progress has been made in ensuring that prices fully recover the costs of 
built infrastructure, there has been no resolution to the debate about the extent to which 
prices should recover the cost of externalities, like damage to the natural infrastructure 
of the environment. (Water CEOs Group 2002, p. 4) 
In August 2003, COAG (2003, p. 1) agreed on the need to refresh the 1994 water 
reform agenda ‘to increase the productivity and efficiency of water use, sustain rural 
and urban communities, and to ensure the health of river and groundwater systems’. 
COAG stated that a key objective of the National Water Initiative would be ‘the 
establishment of best practice water pricing’; and that this would involve ‘the 
principles of user pays and full cost recovery, and include where appropriate, the 
cost of delivery, planning, and environmental impact’ (COAG 2003, p. 3). 
Under clause 73 of the National Water Initiative, COAG agreed to: 
(i)  continue to manage environmental externalities through a range of regulatory 
measures (such as through setting extraction limits in water management plans and 
by specifying the conditions for the use of water in water use licences);  
(ii) continue to examine the feasibility of using market based mechanisms such as 
pricing to account for positive and negative environmental externalities associated 
with water use; and  
(iii) implement  pricing that includes externalities where found to be feasible. 
(COAG 2004, clause 73) 
The language of the National Water Initiative document may contribute to 
confusion of the objective with respect to externalities by also referring to 
recovering the costs of environmental externalities (for example, clause 65).  
1.3  What are economic externalities? 
Economics defines an externality as the side effects or spillovers of an activity that 
are not taken into account in an individual’s or business’ decision to undertake the 
activity and that affect another party’s wellbeing. An externality may be positive or 
negative in its effect. A positive externality occurs when one party generates 
external benefits to another, for which the first party receives no payment or 
compensation. In other words, it raises the production or utility of the externally 
affected party. An example of a positive externality is the benefit that neighbouring 
farmers may derive from a beekeeper whose routine activities supply pollination 
services without charge. A negative externality generates external costs (box 1.2).      





Box 1.2  Example of a negative externality 
Consider an upstream industry, such as a dairy farm, that discharges waste into a river 
as a by product of production. This waste may cause harm to a downstream user of 
that water, such as a freshwater trout farm. Without the ability to influence the dairy 
farm to reduce waste output, the trout farm must either shut down or introduce water 
filters to clean the water before its use. If the dairy farm operates without accounting for 
the negative effects on the industry downstream, it is said to be generating an external 
cost, or a negative externality. Conversely, if the trout farm chooses to locate 
downstream from the dairy farm without accounting for possible negative effects of the 
discharged waste, this decision also generates an external cost. 
 
 
There is an important distinction between the physical presence of a pollutant (such 
as waste discharging into a river) and a negative externality which can arise from 
the pollution. The mere presence of pollution does not necessarily mean there is an 
externality: the economic definition of an externality requires both (1) the pollution 
and (2) a human reaction (reduced wellbeing) to that physical effect (Pearce and 
Turner 1990, p. 61). Further, the economically optimal level of pollution is unlikely 
to be zero. 
Some activities that cause externalities may be modifiable in such a way that the 
externally affected party can be made better off without the affecting party being 
made worse off (a ‘pareto-relevant’ externality) — that is, there is a possibility of 
gain from trade between the two parties. The divergence between the net social 
benefits and the net private benefits associated with a negative externality can (but 
does not necessarily), lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (chapter 3). 
Positive externalities have the opposite effects to negative externalities. Given that 
markets for one good are related to markets for other goods, the ultimate effects 
may be widespread.  
1.4  Outline of the report 
Chapter 2 presents a framework to identify and characterise key environmental 
changes that can arise from the supply and use of irrigation water. Potential physical 
and economic effects of water supply and use need to be identified and understood 
to assess potential policy instruments to manage water externalities.  
Chapter 3 details the economic effects of externalities. It discusses how and when 
private action is likely to address externalities, and the role (if any) of government 
intervention. Chapter 4 discusses issues involved in implementing a corrective (or 
Pigouvian) tax on irrigation water use.      





2  Environmental change and 
externalities from irrigation water 
supply and use 
This chapter discusses a variety of environmental changes and externalities that may 
arise from the supply and use of irrigation water. Environmental changes will not 
always involve externalities. Environmental changes and externalities that may 
result from the actions of rural water utilities and irrigators are identified (section 
2.1). Then, a framework for analysing the characteristics of externalities is 
described (section 2.2). The framework is then applied to selected externalities from 
irrigation water supply and use (sections 2.3 and 2.4).  
2.1  Identifying environmental change and externalities 
Environmental change can occur at each stage in the irrigation water supply and use 
chain:  
•  harvesting — activities within a catchment that influence the volume and quality 
of water available from natural sources for supply by rural water utilities — for 
example, the construction of farm dams and land clearing which may affect 
overland runoff to streams and groundwater 
•  extraction — activities undertaken to extract groundwater for irrigation 
•  storage — the construction, operation and maintenance of reservoirs, including 
releases of water from outlets to natural and to man-made carriers 
•  diversion — the construction, operation and maintenance of weirs, locks, levees 
and other regulators that are used to control the flow of water in natural and to 
man made carriers 
•  delivery — the construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure 
(including open channels, pipes, pumps and meters) that is used to deliver water 
from reservoirs and weir pools to irrigated properties (between a utility’s bulk 
water meter and on-farm meters) 
•  use — the application of water to irrigate crops and pasture via irrigation 
technologies, drainage and re-use techniques.     




Some environmental changes may arise from a combination of activities conducted 
by different agents in different stages of this chain. Blue green algal blooms, for 
example, may be caused by the combination of increased nutrient loads to rivers 
(possibly a result of fertiliser application by irrigators) and decreased river flows 
(possibly a result of actions by water utilities and irrigators). Other activities, such 
as dryland farming that contributes sediment and nutrient loads to river systems, 
may also cause environmental change. 
Distinguishing environmental change from externalities 
Environmental change will not always result in economic externalities — the side 
effects or spillovers of an activity that are not taken into account in an individual’s 
or business’ decision to undertake the activity and that affect another party’s 
wellbeing. An economic externality requires both the environmental change and a 
human reaction to that change (chapter 1). Thus, if there is environmental change 
but the community does not value it (either positively or negatively), then an 
economic externality does not exist. For example, there is no externality if a 
farmer’s water use increases salinity, but only on his property, which does not affect 
another party’s wellbeing, economic or otherwise, other than fully through the 
market price of the affected land.  
2.2  Framework for analysing the characteristics of 
externalities 
Three salient elements of an externality associated with environmental change are 
the source(s) of environmental change, how it is transmitted and its effects 
(figure  2.1). Identifying externalities involves describing (1) how production or 
exchange activities may cause changes to environmental conditions, for example, 
and (2) the effects on other agents. Using these elements, the framework for 
analysing the characteristics of externalities is presented in table 2.1. 
Understanding the characteristics of externalities can assist in assessing whether 
they are affected by changes in irrigation water supply and use. Challenges include:  
•  difficulty in observing and monitoring the environmental changes caused by 
each source, which may vary significantly (in direction and magnitude) across 
different locations 
•  the degree of spatial and temporal variation with environmental change 
•  whether several sources contribute to the same effect, or a single source results 
in several effects, and identifying those causing an environmental change       





•  the degree of knowledge and uncertainty about the relationships between supply 
or use activities, and the resultant changes to environmental conditions. 
Figure 2.1  Key elements of an externality associated with 
environmental change 
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Externalities can arise from point and non-point sources. Point sources arise from 
specific locations (such as a pipe or outfall), whereas non-point sources arise in a 
more indirect and diffuse way (such as contamination from fertiliser used in 
agricultural activity) (Tietenberg 1992, p. 479). The sources (point and non-point) 
and effects of irrigation water externalities are likely to vary significantly over 
location and time. Further, the relationships between activities, changes to 
environmental conditions, and effects can be uncertain or variable. This can be 
particularly true for non-point source externalities (see, for example, Dosi and 
Moretto 1994; Ribaudo, Horan and Smith 1999; Tomasi, Segerson and Braden 
1994). 
Describing the source of irrigation water externalities involves identifying the: 
•  agents associated with the supply and use chain (rural water utilities or 
irrigators) 
•  activities conducted by these agents that could lead to positive or negative 
effects on other parties (table 2.2). 
Sources of externalities 
In supplemented irrigation districts, rural water utilities are responsible for the 
provision of irrigation water — that is, the storage, diversion and delivery of water 
to irrigators. Their activities include constructing, operating and maintaining supply 
infrastructure (including, in some districts, pumping groundwater). The 
infrastructure includes the system of headworks, dams and weirs on natural 
watercourses, as well as the channels, pumps, pipes and meters used in distributing 
water to irrigators. The activities of rural water utilities depend, to varying extents, 
on the activities of irrigators and the design of the supply system — for example.     




The timing and volume of irrigation water demand influences the release of water 
from dams. 
Table 2.1  Framework for analysing the characteristics of 
externalities 




Can the sources be 
identified? 
Can the activities of each 
source be observed? 
Do activities other than 
irrigation supply and use 
result in the 
environmental change? 
Can the environmental 
changes caused by 
each source be 
observed and 
measured? 
Can those who are 
affected be identified? 





Where are the source(s) 
located? Are they 
geographically diffuse? 
Do many sources 
contribute to the same 
effect? 
Are the source(s) and 
effect(s) in a different 
location? 
Do the relationships 
between sources and 
effects change with 
location? 
Where are the effects 
located? Are they 
geographically diffuse? 
Are many effects 
attributable to an 
individual source?  
Temporal 
variation 
To what extent do past 
activities have current (or 
future) effects? 
Are activities affected by 
the natural variability of 
ecosystems and 
ecosystem processes? 
Are there time lags 
between source and 




between sources and 
effects affected by 
natural variability? 
Can effects be 
apportioned between 
past and ongoing 
activities? 
Are effects influenced 






What is the nature of the relationships between sources and effects — for 
example, linear, increasing, decreasing, with threshold effects? 
Are the changes reversible or do they display hysteresis (whereby the nature 
of the relationship between two variables depends on whether the variables 
are increasing or decreasing)? 
Is there uncertainty about the relationship between (observable) activities and 
changes to environmental conditions? Is there uncertainty about the relation 
between changes to environmental conditions and effects? 
It may not always be possible to apportion causes of environmental change among 
different point and non-point sources, given the complex interactions of various 
activities and the environment. Non-point source environmental effects are 
complicated if it is not possible to identify the responsible agents, and/or where 
agents are not in close proximity. These factors lessen the likelihood of successful 
actions being taken to address these externalities. The development of new 
technology, however, may increase the ability to monitor and manage non-point 
source effects — for example, technology to monitor groundwater salinity flows.      





Table 2.2  Sources of irrigation water externalities 
Supply and use chain   Agent  Activities 
Supply (harvesting, 
extraction, storage, 
diversion and delivery) 
Rural water utilities  Constructing, maintaining and operating supply 
infrastructure, including dams, weirs, channels, 
pipes and pumps 
Use  Irrigators  Applying water to crops and pasture, which 
involves or may involve irrigation scheduling, a 
choice of irrigation technology, a choice of 
cropping options, and on-farm water storage, 
re-use and drainagea 
a Rural water utilities also may provide drainage services. 
Transmission of externalities 
An externality may be transmitted through changes to environmental conditions. 
Irrigation water supply and use activities may cause changes to hydrological, water 
quality and ecological conditions (table 2.3). 
Table 2.3  Transmission of irrigation water externalities 
Environmental condition  Examples of indicators of change 
Hydrology  Flow volume and depth, flow variability, seasonality, flooding 
frequency and surface water area 
Water quality  Salinity, biological oxygen demand, pH level (measure of acidity or 
alkalinity), temperature, sediment concentration, turbidity, and 
nutrient and chemical concentration 
Ecology  Species numbers, composition, species diversity, changes in 
physical habitat (including channel form, meanders and 
sedimentation and habitat availability) and ecosystem processes 
(including the reproduction of flora and fauna) 
Hydrological and water quality changes can occur in both surface water (including 
estuarine regions) and groundwater. Changes to ecological conditions may affect 
species numbers, composition and diversity. The number and abundance of native 
fish species may change, for example, or the composition of floodplain vegetation. 
Changes in land use and hydrology can also alter the river habitat, perhaps changing 
channel form, sediment size and particle distribution, and reducing habitat diversity 
by filling deep holes with sediment. 
The attributes of rivers, floodplains, groundwater and estuaries — including 
hydrological, water quality and ecological conditions — are linked by physical 
processes. Changes in a flow regime, for example, can cause changes in material 
transport and river form, which can lead to ecological changes. Links between the 
key attributes of a river system are summarised in figure 2.2.     














































Source: Young 2001.  
Effects of externalities 
Many different parties can potentially be affected, and in different ways, by 
environmental changes caused by irrigation water supply and use. These effects can 
be positive or negative. Externalities can affect the productivity of industries that 
require water or land in their production processes (including agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, mining and manufacturing). Domestic users can be affected by impacts on 
their health or household infrastructure. Individuals (who may also be producers) 
can also be affected if they value water and land for recreational, indigenous, 
cultural and heritage reasons, or for the ecosystem services, biodiversity and habitat 
they provide (table 2.4).  
The nature of potential environmental effects depends on many factors, including 
the volume, timing and location of irrigation. The activities influencing these 
characteristics include irrigation scheduling and on-farm and off-farm water 
storages, drainage and re-use. In many areas, water utilities provide surface and 
sub-surface drainage services to landholders.      





Table 2.4  Effects of irrigation water externalities 
Who is affecteda Potential  effects 
Agricultural producers  Productivity, input costs 
Other industries  Productivityb, input costs 
Domestic consumers  Health, household infrastructure 
Individuals  Recreation and amenity, culture and heritage (including 
indigenous values), regional infrastructure (including roads, 
pipes, cables, railways), ecosystem services, biodiversity, habitat
a Some externalities may affect individuals who belong to more than one category. Rising saline groundwater, 
for example, may reduce crop productivity and result in reduced biodiversity and habitat loss of wetlands. An 
agricultural producer may be affected by both the reduction in crop productivity and the decline in wetland 
health, if the producer values wetlands. b  For industries such as tourism and recreational fishing, an 
externality may be defined as an effect on consumer expenditure (rather than production). 
2.3  Applying the framework to irrigation water supply 
externalities 
This section identifies and characterises some of the main irrigation water supply 
externalities associated with storage, diversion and delivery of water. Storage and 
diversion externalities are associated with constructing, maintaining and operating 
storage and diversion infrastructure. ‘Storage’ involves constructing and operating 
reservoirs. Water is released from a reservoir storage through controls on the outlet 
tower, which is usually built immediately upstream of a dam wall. ‘Diversion 
structures’ include weirs, locks and regulators that are used to control the flow of 
water. Weirs raise the water level along watercourses (creating weir pools) so water 
can be diverted and allowed to flow, under gravity, along networks of channels and 
pipes to users (Goulburn-Murray Water 2001). Storage and diversion activities can 
result in externalities by modifying the flow patterns in watercourses, which have 
ecological and water quality effects (see, for example, Thoms  et  al.  2000). The 
sources, transmission processes and effects of some of the main externalities 
associated with water storage and diversion are summarised in table 2.5. An 
individual activity may have many types of effects, and any individual effect may 
be the result of multiple activities. 
Water is delivered to irrigators through networks of open channels (lined or 
unlined), pipes, pumps and meters operated by rural water utilities. Table  2.6 
presents examples of possible delivery externalities, including channel outfalls, 
leakage and seepage.     




Table 2.5  Examples of possible water storage and diversion 
externalities 
Source Transmission  Effects 
(a) What is the activity? 
(b) Who undertakes this 
activity? 
What changes to environmental conditions 
can occur? 
Who can be affected? Are there 
external costs or benefits? 
1.  Creation of dam 
waterbodies 
(a) Construction of 
reservoir and maintenance 
of water storage levels 
(b) Water utility (or other 
organisations) responsible 
for construction and 
operation of reservoir 
Hydrology — creates a water-body; 
reduces flow 
Water quality — constant, stratified water 
levels have the risk of algal blooms 
Habitat — creates non-flowing lakes 
upstream; reduces the amount of 
submerged habitat downstream 
Ecology — obstructs fish migration 
pathways; affects species and 
communities by changing the hydrology 
(for example, the flow regime); results in 
habitat loss 
Landholders and businesses — 
benefits from reduction of flood 
effects 
Recreational users — benefits from 
increased recreational opportunities 
Tourism industry — benefits from 
increased tourism expenditure 
Individuals — benefits and costs 
from changes in amenity, 
biodiversity, habitat, culture and/or 
heritage 
2.  Regulation of flows 
(a) Presence of regulatory 
structures along 
watercourses to regulate 
and divert flows 
(b) Water utility (or other 
organisations) responsible 
for operation of reservoir 
Hydrology — reduces flow variability; 
reduces flooding frequency; changes the 
seasonality of flows; changes total flow; 
changes floodplain drying and wetting; 
reduces flow through the river mouth 
Habitat — changes in flow result in 
physical changes to the river channel and 
the habitats within it 
Water quality — changes the temporal 
patterns of the water quality 
Ecology — obstructs fish migration 
pathways; affects species and 
communities by changing the hydrology 
(for example, the flow regime); result in 
habitat losses 
Landholders and businesses — 
benefits from reduction of flood 
effects 
Commercial and recreational 
fisheries — costs from decline in 
catch yield 
Tourism industry — benefits and 
costs from changes in visitor 
expenditure 
Individuals — benefits and costs 
from changes in amenity, 
biodiversity, habitat, culture and/or 
heritage 
3. Weir  pools 
(a) Weirs that create weir 
pools from which water is 
diverted 
(b) Water utility (or other 
organisations) responsible 
for operation of reservoir 
Hydrology leads to — unseasonal 
protracted wetting in low level wetlands; 
raises watertables under nearby 
floodplains 
Habitat — creates stable water levels 
upstream creates fluctuating water levels 
downstream 
Water quality — constant, stratified water 
levels have the risk of algal booms 
Ecology — results in loss of bank habitat 
due to permanent wetting; reduces 
productivity 
Commercial and recreational 
fisheries — costs from decline in 
catch yield 
Tourism industry — benefits and 
costs from changes in visitor 
expenditure 
Individuals — benefits and costs 
from changes in amenity, 
biodiversity, habitat, culture and/or 
heritage 
4. Cold  water  dam 
releases 
(a) Releases of cold water 
from low level outlets in 
reservoir for irrigation 
(b) Water utility 
responsible for operation 
of reservoir 
Water quality — decreases downstream 
water temperature; increases nutrient load 
and concentrations of natural toxicants 
such as hydrogen sulphide and heavy 
metals 
Ecology — leads to a decline in the 
number of fish species; changes species 
composition 
Commercial and recreational 
fisheries — costs from decline in 
catch yield 
Tourism industry — costs from 
decline in visitor expenditure 
Individuals — costs from changes in 
amenity, biodiversity, habitat, culture 
and/or heritage 
 (Continued next page)      





Table 2.5  (Continued) 
Source Transmission  Effects 
5.  Rapid changes in 
river height 
(a) Storage releases that 
cause rapid rises and falls 
in river height 
(b) Water utility 
responsible for operation 
of reservoir 
Hydrology — affects flow regime; 
decreases bank stability; changes river 
morphology 
Water quality — increases turbidity and 
sediment transport (through erosion) 
Ecology — affects ecology by changing 
the hydrology (habitat, flow regime) and 
water quality 
Commercial and recreational 
fisheries — costs from changes in 
catch yield and flow regime 
Tourism industry — benefits and 
costs from changes in tourism 
expenditure 
Individuals — costs from changes in 
amenity, biodiversity, habitat, culture 
and/or heritage 
Sources: Ball et al. 2001; Gippel and Blackham 2002; Thoms et al. 2000. 
Observability of irrigation water supply externalities 
Many elements of water supply externalities are observable. The location of supply 
infrastructure is fixed and observable, and the organisations responsible for its 
operation and management are known. In some situations, the changes to 
environmental conditions can be measured — for example, flows are monitored at 
gauging stations along the River Murray, and daily flow data are publicly available 
from the Murray–Darling Basin Commission. 
Although the sources of water supply externalities are generally observable, it is not 
always possible to identify all those who are affected, and even more difficult to 
know how much they are affected. In the case of increased groundwater discharge 
and changes to downstream water quality, externalities may be transmitted over 
long distances and with significant time lags. 
Variation of irrigation water supply externalities across locations  
Although sources of supply externalities are generally not diffuse, the effects may 
be geographically dispersed. In some situations, the source and effects are located in 
the reaches immediately upstream or downstream of the regulatory structure, such 
as the recreational and tourism benefits of reservoir waterbodies, or the decline in 
fish species due to cold water releases and the obstruction of fish passage. Given the 
spatial links between hydrological and ecosystem processes, however, effects could 
extend for a significant distance from the source or may be located far from the 
source, or in other parts of the catchment. An algal bloom, for example, may 
develop in the thermally stratified water of a weir pool, but could then spread 
hundreds of kilometres along a river away from its initial source. Further, the 
operation of large infrastructure — such as the Hume Dam on the River Murray —     




can influence flow regimes of rivers and floodplains hundreds of kilometres 
downstream. 
Table 2.6  Examples of possible delivery externalities 
Source Transmission  Effects 
(a) What is the activity? 
(b) Who undertakes this activity? 
What changes to environmental 
conditions can occur? 
Who can be affected? Are there 
external costs or benefits? 
1. Channel  outfalls 
(a) Water that is released into a 
delivery channel but not diverted 
onto farms and that returns to the 
downstream environment 
(b) Operators of irrigation water 
distribution systems 
Hydrology — changes the timing of 
river flows 
Water quality — channel outfalls 
may have different water quality 
(for example, lower salinity) from 
that of downstream flows 
Habitat — released water provides 
aquatic habitat that would 
otherwise not be available 
Ecology — changes the hydrology 
and water quality 
Downstream users of water 
including agricultural producers, 
other industries and domestic 
consumers — costs or benefits, 
depending on water quality changes 
Commercial fisheries — changes in 
catch yield 
Recreational users — changes in 
catch yield and flow regime 
Tourism industry — changes in 
tourism expenditure 
Individuals — changes in amenity, 
biodiversity, habitat, culture and/or 
heritage 
2.  Leakage and seepage 
(a) Water that is ‘lost’ from 
distribution channels or that 
moves through the beds of 
distribution channels 
(b) Operators of irrigation water 
distribution systems 
Hydrology — ponded areas form 
adjacent to channels; increases 
groundwater recharge; raises water 
tables 
Water quality — changes river 
salinity through saline groundwater 
recharge 
Ecology — changes occur due to 
changed river salinity 
As identified for channel outfalls, 
and also: 
Agricultural producers — costs from 
increased waterlogging or benefits 
from pooled groundwater source 
Individuals (who may be producers) 
— costs from damage to regional 
infrastructure 
Sources: DNRE 2002; Marsden Jacob Associates 2003. 
The relationships between activities and effects can vary according to site-specific 
factors. Gippel and Blackham (2002) assessed the ecological effects of flow 
regulation along the River Murray and identified hydrological, geomorphic and 
ecological changes along eight distinct zones of the river. In all cases, the 
environmental changes varied in magnitude in different zones. For example, 
summer/autumn flows increased change upstream of Torrumburry Weir, but 
decreased change downstream. Young, Dyer and Thoms (2001), in a case study of 
the upper Murrumbidgee River, also showed that water resource development can 
lead to very different flow changes (and expected ecological effects) in different 
locations within the same catchment, and on the same river. 
Some water diverted from rivers or dams is ‘lost’ in conveyance from storage to 
irrigator properties. Water losses in irrigation delivery systems can occur through 
channel outfalls, channel seepage and leakage, evaporation, bank overtopping, the 
ejection of water due to operational error, equipment failure or rainfall, metering 
error, and unrecorded use (Marsden Jacob Associates 2003). In some regions,      





distribution losses can provide positive externalities (Marsden Jacob 
Associates 2003) — for example, in the Coleambally Irrigation Area, leakage and 
seepage water from distribution channels has been an important source of water for 
some farmers, and channel outfalls provide water to downstream ecosystems and 
other users. The recent introduction of ‘total channel control’ technology has 
significantly reduced channel outfalls from the Colleambally Irrigation Area. The 
effects of delivery losses depend on many location factors, including soil types, 
delivery infrastructure, the distance that water is conveyed, and operating systems 
and practices. 
Conveyance losses are not an externality for either the irrigation water supplier or 
irrigation water users. A water business accounts for the cost of conveyance losses 
through accounting provisions and in setting prices, and these losses do not reduce 
the volume of water ordered and received by an irrigator. A water loss through 
illegal activities benefiting the user (who may be an irrigator) which is not 
accounted for in transactions with suppliers is not considered an externality. 
Variation of irrigation water supply externalities over time 
Water supply and delivery externalities can be characterised by time lags between 
the operation of infrastructure and the effect. These time lags vary — some (such as 
the effects of reversed summer and winter flow levels) reflect short-term 
seasonality, whereas others depend more on longer-term natural climate variability 
including droughts and other extreme weather events.  
In the case of water provision externalities, decreased (or increased) flooding 
frequency, for example, may lead to changes in wetlands over several decades, 
resulting in environmental outcomes, such as an increased rate of death of mature 
trees, the failure of seeds to germinate, a reduction in the abundance of floristic 
species, and a decline in fish and waterbirds. In contrast, local extinctions of some 
fish species in rivers may occur only a few years after dam construction impedes 
fish migration, although this depends on the lifespan of certain species. 
In the case of delivery externalities, environmental changes transmitted through 
groundwater recharge (such as downstream salinity) may occur some time after 
water has been delivered if groundwater movement is slow. Damage to 
infrastructure due to saline groundwater is also likely to occur gradually. Positive 
externalities of delivery losses (see above), however, may occur soon after water is 
delivered, especially in established irrigation systems where several decades of 
irrigation has filled the soil profile with water.     




Information on hydrological changes over time is generally more widely available 
than that for ecological effects. Historical and ongoing flow data are available at 
small time-steps, which enables analysis and modelling of the hydrological changes 
resulting from river regulation. In contrast, ecological consequences are less well 
understood, given the paucity of suitable data and because ‘ecological responses are 
complex, often delayed, and can manifest in a location that is distant from the site of 
the hydrological disturbance’ (Gippel and Blackham 2002, p. iv). 
Knowledge and uncertainty about processes 
Understanding how species and ecosystems respond to different flow scenarios is 
important to develop predictive capacity (Roberts 2002) — that is, to analyse the 
likely effects and tradeoffs (such as for recreational or productive values) from 
different supply systems or river and wetland management activities. 
The instream hydrological changes resulting from reservoir design, the operation of 
regulating devices and the extraction of water for offstream use are well 
documented, both in general terms, and for individual river sites (box 2.1). Other 
studies have attempted to develop indicators to describe the links between 
ecological condition and flow regime (see, for example, Chessman 2001; 
Marshall et al. 2001; Young, Dyer and Thoms 2001). 
The complex ecological responses to changing flow regimes are not fully 
understood (Young et al. 2002). The Murray–Darling Basin Commission’s 
Sustainable Rivers Audit is the first program designed for the systematic and 
integrated collection of basin-wide ecological data. Many researchers have noted 
the need for further integration of the disciplines of hydrology and ecology, and for 
structured, comprehensive analysis of the ecological effects of flow regulation 
(Thoms et al. 2000; Marshall et al. 2001; Gippel and Blackham 2002). Thoms et al. 
(2000) also recommended further studies of the effects of water quality (including 
turbidity and temperature) on the functioning of the instream environment. 
Another information problem is that studies have generally focused on monitoring 
and modelling the effects caused by increasing river regulation. River systems may 
be affected by hysteresis, which is the inability of an ecosystem to return to its 
original state following the removal of a shock or interference, such as a system of 
dams and weirs. If flows in a river are lowered as a result of irrigation diversions, 
for example, and then increased to their original level as a result of reduced 
irrigation, then aquatic, riparian and wetland environmental conditions may not 
recover to their original state, perhaps due to threshold effects resulting in 
irreversible changes to species, populations and ecosystems.      






Box 2.1  Hydrological effects of flow regulation on the River 
Murray 
Hydrological changes are generally measured by comparing current flow data to 
historical ‘pre-regulation’ data drawn from periods prior to the construction of storage 
and diversion structures. Commonly documented changes to flow regulation on the 
River Murray, for example, include: 
•  a reduction in the frequency of small to medium sized floods 
•  an unseasonal shift to high flows in summer and low flows in winter below large 
storages and upstream of major extraction infrastructure 
•  reduced total volume of flow due to extraction 
•  increased flow resulting from interbasin transfers such as the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme 
•  reduced velocity, increased depth and the removal of drying cycles upstream of 
locks and weirs 
•  modified day-to-day variation in flows (rates of rise and fall). 
Sources: Gippel and Blackham 2002; Maheshwari, Walker and McMahon 1995; MDBC 2002; Roberts and 
Marston 2000; Thoms et al. 2000; Young 2001. 
 
 
Understanding of the effects of conveyance losses is also incomplete, although there 
is some information on the volume of such water losses. Information on water 
delivery efficiency is available for several irrigation water providers 
(ANCID 2002), and for comparing open channels to piped systems (Harding and 
Viney 2000; ANCID 2002). In open channel systems typical of the southern 
Murray–Darling Basin, outfalls are frequently the largest source of losses, 
accounting for up to 45 per cent of total losses. In contrast, smaller amounts of 
water are thought to be ‘lost’ to evaporation (10 per cent) and seepage/leakage 
(5 per cent) (Marsden Jacob Associates 2003). Harding and Viney (2000) estimated 
that open channels in irrigation districts in northern Victoria lose 10 per cent of 
water to outfalls and 5 per cent to leakage and seepage, with figures much lower in 
mainly piped systems. The volume of water ‘lost’ in irrigation conveyance, 
however, is generally not known with precision for any specific cause (Marsden 
Jacob Associates 2003). Further, although guidelines have been established for 
measuring channel seepage (SKM 2002), the fate of ‘lost’ conveyance water — and 
its potential effects — is generally not well documented.     




2.4  Applying the framework to irrigation water use 
externalities 
This section identifies and discusses some of the characteristics of irrigation water 
use externalities, including waterlogging, land salinisation and downstream salinity. 
The sources, transmission and effects of some of the main externalities from 
irrigation water use are summarised in table 2.7. The sources and transmission of 
the externalities may overlap — for example, both downstream salinity and 
waterlogging may result from an application of irrigation water in excess of crop 
requirements, which increases recharge to the root zone. 
Observability of irrigation water use externalities 
The groundwater recharge and instream salinity changes that may result from one 
property’s irrigation are generally not observable — irrigation salinity effects have 
diffuse (or non-point) sources. Several studies have modelled salt loads from 
different regions or subcatchments, however, based on information about soils, crop 
types and technology (see, for example, Heaney and Levantis 2001; Heaney, Beare 
and Bell 2001a). Combinations of these factors can be used as ‘proxy indicators’ of 
the potential salinity effects resulting from irrigation. 
Like salinity, pollutant loads from individual properties are generally not 
observable. The ability to observe and monitor diffuse sources is further 
complicated by the many different forms of pollutants — for example, nitrogen and 
phosphorous can occur in inorganic or organic forms, and can be transported as 
dissolved or particulate nutrients (PC 2003). Further, in many regions, activities 
other than irrigation — such as land clearing, the loss of riparian vegetation, and 
overstocking — contribute significantly to instream sediment and nutrient loads. 
Modelling the physical processes, however, could provide information about the 
sources, transport and effects of salt and pollutant loads, which cannot be directly 
measured or observed. 
Variation of irrigation water use externalities across locations 
The type and severity of externalities can vary significantly across irrigation 
activities located in different regions. Different irrigation schemes — for example, 
coastal, river valley or floodplain schemes — tend to be associated with different 
environmental changes and effects. 
      





Table 2.7  Examples of possible irrigation water use externalities 
Source Transmission  Effectsc 
(a) What is the production 
or exchange activity? 
(b) Who undertakes this 
activity? 
What changes to environmental 
conditions can occur? 
Who can be affected? Are there external 
costs or benefits? 
1. Waterlogging  and 
land salinisation 
(a) Application of irrigation 
water in excess of crop 
requirements, where 




Hydrology — increases 
groundwater recharge and results 
in waterlogging 
Water quality — relocates salt in 
the soil to the soil surface 
Habitat — may cause freshwater 
habitats to become salinised 
Ecology — changes the ecology in 
response to increased groundwater 
levels and salinity 
Agricultural producers — costs from 
waterlogging 
Household/business — costs from damage 
to buildings and infrastructure 
Individuals — costs and benefits from 
changes in amenity, biodiversity, habitat, 
culture, heritage, and indigenous values 
Commercial and recreational fisheries (and 
associated tourism) — costs from decline in 
catch yield following lost fish breeding sites 
2. Downstream  salinity 
(a) Application of irrigation 
water in excess of crop 
requirements, where 
drainage is insufficient to 
prevent groundwater 
recharge, leading to 
increased baseflow to 
streamsb 
(b) Irrigators 
Hydrology — increases 
groundwater recharge and the flow 
of water into streams; leads to 
saline water incursions into surface 
waterways 
Water quality — increases the 
discharge of salt into streams 
(where groundwater is more saline 
than river flows) 
Ecology — changes the ecology in 
response to increased stream 
salinity 
Downstream water users including 
agricultural producers, other industries and 
domestic consumers — costs or benefits, 
depending on water quality 
Commercial fisheries — costs or benefits 
from increased or decreased catch yieldsd 
Recreational users — costs and benefits 
from changes in catch yield and flow regime
Tourism industry — costs and benefits from 
changes in tourist expenditure 
Individuals — costs and benefits from 
changes in amenity, biodiversity, habitat, 
culture, heritage and indigenous values 
3. Irrigation  water 
pollution 
(a) Application of irrigation 
water in excess of crop 
requirementsa 
Irrigation in conjunction 
with fertiliser and chemical 
application 
(b) Irrigators 
Water quality — transports 
sediments, nutrients (nitrogen and 
phosphorous) and chemicals 
(pesticides and herbicides) to 
surface water and groundwater 
bodies and coastal regions 
Ecology — changes the water 
quality, contributing to 
eutrophication 
Downstream water users, including 
agricultural producers, other industries and 
domestic consumers — costs or benefits 
depending on water quality changes 
Commercial fisheries — costs or benefits 
from changes in catch yields 
Recreational users — costs or benefits from 
changes in catch yields and ecosystem 
health 
Tourism industry — costs or benefits from 
changes in tourist expenditure 
Individuals — costs or benefits from 
changes in amenity, biodiversity, habitat, 
culture, heritage and indigenous values 
a It is not possible to achieve 100 per cent irrigation efficiency. Some leaching to groundwater is considered 
necessary to prevent salt buildup in soils. b Increasing the baseflow to streams may be beneficial, where 
groundwater is less saline than river flows. c May be positive or negative, unless specified. d Several 
experimental saline aquaculture schemes, which intercept and pump saline groundwater, are being trialled or 
developed in Queensland, South Australia and New South Wales.  
Sources: Ball et al. 2001; MDBMC 1999; PC 2003.     




Floodplain irrigation schemes may be more susceptible to waterlogging, depending 
on drainage patterns and underlying watertables. Nutrient loads from irrigation in 
catchments draining to major inland rivers have the potential to affect aquatic 
ecosystems by contributing to eutrophication and algal blooms. In contrast, nutrient 
exports from irrigation schemes in catchments draining directly to the coast are 
more likely to have an effect on marine ecosystems (PC 2003). Nutrient loads also 
depend on the type of agriculture undertaken in each district. 
Many factors influence the extent of salinity and explain its spatial variation, 
including groundwater recharge rates, underlying groundwater salinity, water use 
efficiency, soil types, the type and connectivity of aquifers, and the location of 
irrigation relative to waterways and land use (Beare and Heaney 2002). One reason 
for saline baseflow to rivers being more evident in the south of the Murray–Darling 
Basin is that this region is underlain by a sedimentary aquifer that has limited 
storage capacity and is largely saturated (MDBMC 1999). Rising groundwater 
levels may also have positive or negative on-farm effects, depending on local 
conditions. In some rice-growing regions in the Murrumbidgee region of New 
South Wales, for example, rising levels of relatively non-saline groundwater benefit 
rice production. In other regions, such as the Shepparton irrigation region in 
northern Victoria, shallow saline water tables have a negative effect on crop and 
pasture yields. 
The effects of salinity and of pollutant and sediment loads in waterways are also 
likely to be geographically dispersed and to vary according to the location of the 
source. Further, downstream effects will vary from location to location given, for 
example, the differing tolerances of irrigated crops (Heaney, Beare and Bell 2001b). 
Variation of irrigation water use externalities over time 
A significant period may elapse between the application of irrigation water and its 
downstream effect. Generally, there is a considerable lag between land use changes 
and the mobilisation of salt to rivers and in the landscape (MDBMC 1999). 
Consequently, if irrigation practices were to change today, downstream river 
salinities might continue to increase as a result of past activities.  
In contrast to dryland areas, where there are usually long lead times before salinity 
appears, irrigation salinity problems emerge relatively soon after irrigation 
commences. Salt mobilisation may occur more rapidly in irrigation districts where 
recharge rates are very high and the sources are close to the rivers (MDBMC 1999). 
The time lag between irrigation and the effects of increased pollutant loads is also 
likely to vary. Increased phosphorus and nitrogen loads in rivers are more likely to      





lead to algal blooms during drier summers when flow is reduced and river water 
levels are low — for example, during the summer of 1991-92, when a 
1000 kilometre algal bloom spread along the Darling River. In contrast, nutrient and 
sediment inputs to the Great Barrier Reef lagoon tend to occur in plumes following 
heavy rainfall. These pollutant loads may directly interfere with the reproduction 
and recruitment processes of coral and seagrasses, but may also have the longer 
term effect of diminishing the ability of coral to recover from acute effects such as 
cyclones (PC 2003). 
Knowledge and uncertainty about processes 
The physical processes associated with irrigation salinity are generally well 
understood and described. Salinity problems are caused by activities that have 
changed the hydrology of the landscape and accelerated the movement of salts into 
rivers and onto land. Changes to vegetation cover — especially the replacement of 
deep rooted perennial vegetation with shallow rooted annuals that have lower water 
requirements — have in many areas resulted in an imbalance between rainfall and 
plant water use (MDBMC 1999). This imbalance increases the amount of water 
entering groundwater systems (recharge). As watertables rise through naturally 
saline soils, potential salinity problems include increased discharge of salt into 
streams (where groundwater is more saline than river flows), waterlogging and the 
relocation of salt in the soil to the soil surface. 
Knowledge about the ecological effects of instream salinity is incomplete. Although 
extensive studies have been conducted on instream and terrestrial ecological 
processes and biodiversity, the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
(MDBMC 1999) and the Department of Land and Water Conservation (2000) noted 
that few studies have examined the effects of salinity on individual species, and that 
the effects of salt on natural systems is not generally well understood. Some species, 
such as fish species that evolved under saline conditions, have relatively high 
tolerances for instream salinity. Many Australian species, however, are adversely 
affected by increasing salinity, especially above the threshold salinity concentration 
of 1500 EC (MDBMC 1999). This threshold is approximately the upper limit of 
tolerance for many individual species, such as aquatic macrophytes and invertebrate 
fauna. Ecological processes are also affected as rising salinity causes the decline of 
the less salt-tolerant species from the landscape. Where trees die, for example, the 
physical structure of the ecosystem changes, and the habitat and breeding grounds 
of a range of flora and fauna disappear (MDBMC 1999). 
The effects of waterlogging and land salinisation display threshold effects — that is, 
when the saline watertable rises to within two metres of the land surface, capillary 
action, transpiration by plants and evaporation at the land surface draw up the saline     




water and concentrate the salt. (Several studies have examined the effects of salinity 
on agricultural productivity and infrastructure — see, for example, Hajkowicz and 
Young 2002.) Salinity thresholds also exist for ecosystem health (box 2.2). 
In general terms, the effects of increased nutrient and sediment loads on aquatic and 
marine ecosystems are well documented. Given the complexity of physical and 
ecological processes, however, it is generally difficult to attribute specific effects to 
individual sources. There are many sources of nutrients other than irrigated 
properties, for example. Further, nutrient loads are linked to sediment loads, and the 
risks to aquatic or marine ecosystems also depend on river flows and natural climate 
variability. 
 
Box 2.2  Salinity thresholds for ecosystem health 
Salinity exhibits threshold effects for ecosystem health (and presumably the values 
derived from ecosystems) at a concentration of about 1500 EC. At low concentrations, 
increasing salinity levels result in minor increases in ecosystem effects, because many 
species of invertebrates and aquatic and riparian plants can tolerate salinities up to 
1500 EC. Beyond this concentration, however, several species exhibit adverse lethal 
and sub-lethal responses, including loss of vigour, reduced species diversity, and 
progressive depression of growth and plant size. Although 1500 EC is commonly cited 
as the ‘threshold level’ for ecosystem effects of salinity, the rapid increases in 
ecosystem effects generally occur over a range of 1000–2000 EC. 
Source: Hart et al. 2002. 
 
 
Knowledge about adjustment possibilities 
To design the best response to an externality, the policy maker requires information 
about the costs imposed on all parties by the environmental effects, and the costs to 
all parties of reducing or avoiding the effects. The second kind of information is 
generally hard for policy makers to collect or estimate. Externality policies often 
place the burden of ameliorating externalities on those who, in some simple sense, 
are judged to have caused the externality. Yet, in an economic sense, each party has 
contributed to the externality since externalities are reciprocal. There is no 
justification on efficiency grounds for imposing the full external costs of an 
externality on the party designated as the polluter. 
2.5 Summary 
•  Many of the externalities associated with irrigation water supply and use are 
complex and the links between sources and effects of environmental change are      





not always well understood. At times, it is difficult to identify, observe and 
measure effects from individual sources, and resulting changes in environmental 
conditions. 
•  Although there is considerable knowledge of relevant physical and ecological 
processes, significant knowledge gaps exist, especially in terms of predicting 
how ecosystems will respond to changes in water supply, use and other 
management activities. 
•  Specific characteristics of the environmental effects of irrigation water supply 
and use include the following: 
–  It may be difficult to observe and monitor salinity and pollutant contributions 
from individual irrigators; in contrast, dams and weirs are fixed and 
observable, and their operations are known. 
–  In many cases, environmental changes and effects are caused by multiple 
activities, including activities by agents not associated with irrigation supply 
or use. Irrigation water use may only be indirectly related to the unintended 
effects — for example, by influencing the operation of supply infrastructure. 
–  The relationship between an activity and its effects can vary significantly 
with location. An individual activity may have many types of effects, and any 
individual effect could be the result of multiple activities. Further, the effects 
can be geographically dispersed or located far from the source. 
–  In some situations, a time lag may exist between an activity and its effects. 
Time lags may be relatively short, ranging from immediate (such as changed 
flow regimes when a storage is constructed), to a few years (such as the effect 
of obstructed fish passage on species with short lifespans), or several hundred 
years (such as movement of saline water through slow moving aquifers). 
–  The effects may be located relatively close to the source (such as 
waterlogging from raised watertables), far from the source (such as 
downstream users of surface water that has reduced water quality due to 
activities far upstream) or dispersed across significant distances (such as algal 
blooms). 
•  Externalities associated with environmental change also vary significantly in the 
extent to which the environmental changes are characterised by uncertainty. 
Further, there is variation in the level of understanding of how changes in 
environmental conditions result in unintended effects. 
•  There is no justification on efficiency grounds for imposing the full external 
costs of an externality on the party designated as the polluter.      





3  Externalities and potential responses 
This chapter explains the economic concept and consequences of externalities 
associated with environmental change and discusses how they may be addressed by 
private actions or, if the benefits outweigh the costs, by government intervention. 
Section 3.1 details the economic effects of externalities and provides the conceptual 
framework for analysis. Section 3.2 discusses some factors affecting the likelihood 
of private action. Section 3.3 considers the case for government intervention. A 
brief discussion of core principles for assessing and designing policy instruments is 
provided in section 3.4. The section  3.5 considers efficiency and the choice of 
policy instrument in the presence of uncertainty. The final section discusses the 
theoretical effects of introducing a Pigouvian tax.  
3.1  The economic effects of externalities 
As noted in chapter 1, the divergence between private costs and benefits and social 
(external) costs and benefits associated with externalities can lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources. The potential effects of negative externalities on market 
allocations are illustrated in box 3.1. Specifically, too much of the activity causing 
the externality may be undertaken, so:  
•  the price paid by consumers is too low and 
•  too much of the externality may be produced. 
Since markets for one good are related to markets for other goods, the effects may, 
at times, be widespread. 
3.2  The likelihood of private action 
Where the action of one party affects another, the parties may be able to negotiate to 
achieve an efficient outcome, irrespective of the initial allocation, and in the 
absence of prohibitive transaction costs (Coase 1960). One possible outcome of two 
parties (a dairy and trout farmer) negotiating, using the example in box 3.1, is that 
the trout farmer pays the dairy farmer for some reduction in discharge if the dairy 
farmer has a ‘right’ to pollute. Alternatively, if the trout farmer has the right to clean     




water, the dairy farmer may pay the trout farmer for some level of continued 
discharge. 
 
Box 3.1  Equating marginal costs and benefits 
An upstream industry, such as a dairy farm, might impose costs, by way of reduced 
production, on a downstream industry, such as a freshwater trout farm, through 
discharge of waste. To simplify, assume that the waste is proportional to the quantity of 
milk produced; and that the trout farmer can do nothing by herself to reduce the costs. 
The marginal net private benefit curve (MNPB) shows the minimum price that a dairy 
farmer is willing to accept to reduce milk production a little. It represents the reductions 
in profit when output varies. QM is thus the level of milk production that the dairy farmer 
would choose without considering the external costs of production. In other words, QM 
maximises the net private benefits or profit to the dairy farmer. 
The marginal external cost curve (MEC) shows the maximum amount that a freshwater 
trout farmer is willing to pay for a reduction of milk waste to indicated levels. Given the 
MNPB and MEC curves shown, the level of production that could maximise the 
combined benefits to both parties is given by Q
*, where MEC equals MNPB. Thus the 
optimal level of pollution from an economic perspective is that emitted as a result of 
production at Q
*. This would be achieved if the trout farmer paid the dairy farmer, 
according to the schedule MEC, to reduce her output of milk and waste; or if the dairy 
paid the fish farmer, according to the schedule MNPB, not to exercise a legal right to 
force the dairy to stop pollution; or if a tax schedule, shown by MEC, were imposed on 
milk/waste (so the actual tax paid becomes 0P* x 0Q*).  
If the downstream farm itself has abatement possibilities, then the story is more 
complicated than can be shown in a simple diagram. 
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The arrangement that maximises the combined net benefits to both parties is where 
the marginal cost of discharge to the trout farmer equals the marginal benefit from 
discharge to the dairy farmer, irrespective of the initial allocation of rights. Waste, 
which is positively related to production, is still being discharged, but the costs of 
reducing discharges further exceed the benefits. 
Incentives for and the likelihood of private action (and thus the applicability of 
Coasean solutions) may be affected by the degree of exclusivity or rivalry of the 
externalities. The likelihood of private action may also reflect the costs of 
identifying producers of, and those affected by, externalities, and of measuring the 
amount of externality produced and the extent of the effect. These factors are 
discussed below. 
Exclusivity 
Externalities are exclusive (or excludable) if all of the benefits can be captured by 
those undertaking production or mitigation action. Alternatively, the externality is 
said to be non-exclusive if it is costly or impossible to exclude people not 
contributing to production or mitigation action from receiving the benefits of that 
action. In this case, there is an incentive for individuals to ‘free ride’ on the actions 
of others — for example, by obtaining the benefits from others’ negotiations that 
lead to a reduction in pollution. Externalities may be characterised according to the 
ability of individuals to ‘free ride’ on the benefits from externality production (in 
the case of positive externalities) or from the mitigation of externality effects (in the 
case of negative externalities). 
Non-exclusivity reduces the likelihood of private action being taken to address an 
externality. Some private provision of non-excludable goods is still possible, 
however, as demonstrated by the existence of voluntary organisations seeking, for 
example, to enhance the biodiversity of rivers and streams. Notwithstanding such 
voluntary acts, less of a desired non-exclusive good is likely to be provided than if 
non-paying beneficiaries could be excluded (Wills 1997). 
Exclusivity is affected by the specification of property rights and the ability to 
exclude individuals or groups who value access. It may be possible, for example, to 
exclude others from access to a lake if it is zoned for a specific purpose, or from use 
of river water if extractors must have a permit to extract water. The costs of such 
exclusion can be reduced by technological development and improved scientific 
information. The development of devices that scramble and decode television 
signals, for example, has allowed the creation of a market for pay television. Lower 
exclusion costs allow better definition and enforcement of property rights and 
therefore, the extension of markets (Wills 1997).     





Externalities may also be characterised by the extent to which one person’s 
enjoyment of the benefits of externality production or mitigation reduces or 
eliminates enjoyment by others (rivalry). Benefits derived by one individual from 
water quality improvements that enhance the ecological and aesthetic values of a 
river, for example, will not lessen the enjoyment of others. If, however downstream 
irrigators benefit from improved water quality by extracting water from the river, 
there is less water for other consumptive purposes; in this case, the benefits from 
external effects are rivalrous. 
Some types of externality effects are non-rival up to a point (sometimes called the 
point of congestion) after which they become rival. The external benefits of a dam 
to recreational boaters, for example, may be non-rival up to some point, beyond 
which the addition of another boat diminishes the enjoyment by others. 
Costs of identification and measurement 
Private provision of goods and services can be hindered if the costs of identifying 
the producers of, and those affected by, externalities, and measuring the amount of 
externality generated and the extent of its impact are high (Wills 1997).  
Non-point externalities (either source or effect) often involve a large number of 
agents spread over a wide geographic area (chapter 2). Generally, the transaction 
costs of coordination and negotiation increase as the number of parties involved and 
their dispersion (in terms of either the cause or effect of the externality) increase. 
These costs can pose a barrier to private action to mitigate the externality to an 
efficient level. 
3.3  Is there a case for government intervention? 
In some cases, private action might address an environmental externality, thus there 
would be no role for government. Neighbouring farmers, for example, might 
coordinate their timing of water use from an irrigation channel with limited 
capacity, if using water from the channel at the same time resulted in significantly 
lower water flows. Government actions might also ‘crowd out’ some more effective 
and efficient voluntary private sector activities to address the externality. 
If private action fails to address an externality adequately, there may be a role for 
government intervention. However, the presence of an externality does not 
necessarily imply that there is a market failure which is worth correcting. In the case      





of a negative externality, the existence of an economically-relevant market failure 
depends on whether, on the margin, the private benefit from the activity generating 
the externality is less than the unrecompensed or external cost that it imposes on 
others. If, in contrast, the marginal private benefit exceeds these marginal external 
costs, then any further reduction, in the level of the externality-generating activity 
itself (for example, through a tax or regulation), will reduce aggregate net economic 
benefits. Beare and Heaney (2002) illustrated this for water (an input to production), 
where water availability may be restricted. They also considered the case of 
restricted supply and variable demand — for example, in response to changes in 
weather conditions. 
Even when the market fails to provide the optimal level of a good or service, 
government intervention still may not be appropriate. The benefits of proposed 
government intervention may be less than the costs (which include the costs of 
policy development, administration, monitoring, enforcement and compliance). This 
may be so for a variety of reasons, including high information requirements, a lack 
of ability to properly enforce regulations, rapid technological change and evasive 
responses by targets of regulation. Policies intended to deal with one set of 
problems sometimes generate side or flow-on effects, which may be positive or 
negative. Any assessment of the merits of government action need to account for 
these wider costs and benefits.  
3.4  Policy design and assessment 
Four criteria for assessing and designing policy instruments are appropriateness, 
equity, effectiveness and efficiency (table 3.1). Transaction costs are important to 
consider and should not be overlooked in any analysis. 
A proposed policy instrument is likely to be less effective and efficient if its design 
does not consider existing policies to address the problem (including non-regulatory 
approaches), or if it causes unintended distortions in the market.  
Table 3.1  Key principles for designing and assessing policy 
instruments 
Principle Description 
Appropriateness  Is government intervention warranted? Is the goal worth achieving?  
Effectiveness  Does the policy achieve the stated objectives (that is, is it likely to result in 
desired changes in behaviour or achieve targeted outcomes)? 
Efficiency  Taking into account the costs of designing, implementing and monitoring a 
policy (or transaction costs), does the policy achieve the highest net benefit of 
all the alternative policies?     




Equity  Are there equity considerations? 
Costs associated with designing, implementing, monitoring and enforcing a policy 
instrument include: 
•  information costs required by policy makers to design policy — for example, to 
set an appropriate tax level or quantity restriction 
•  administration, enforcement and monitoring costs incurred by agencies — for 
example, to assess auction bids, monitor adherence to contract terms or enforce 
non compliance with regulation 
•  search and negotiation costs incurred by market participants — for example, to 
search for other parties with whom to trade water allocation rights, 
environmental credits or pollution permits 
•  compliance costs — for example, costs incurred by irrigators when providing 
information to regulators regarding contract adherence.  
These costs are sometimes collectively referred to as transaction costs. There are 
several definitions of transaction costs — for example, Williamson (1985) defined 
transaction costs as the ‘comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring 
task completion under alternative governance structures’, Arrow (1969), noted that 
they are the costs of running the economic system, and Gordon (1994) defined them 
as the expenses of organising and participating in a market or implementing a 
government policy. 
Transaction costs consist of both ex ante and ex post costs. In the context of 
assessing policy options, ex ante measurement is appropriate. McCann and 
Easter (2002) noted that the costs involved with the final transaction are relatively 
easy to measure, but that those involved with initial information gathering and 
policy design enactment and implementation are rarely documented. The different 
features of irrigation water externalities (chapter 2) can have important 
consequences for the transaction costs of different policy instruments. 
Defining the problem and target 
A fundamental step in designing policy solutions to environmental problems is to be 
clear on the policy objective. In designing and assessing policy instruments to 
manage irrigation water externalities, the aim should be to alter behaviour so an 
appropriate level of external costs from changing environmental conditions are 
taken into account. Consequently, addressing an externality in an economic sense 
may not be consistent with achieving a predetermined environmental outcome.      





In some cases, the scientific knowledge of the potential effects of environmental 
change is limited, which makes it difficult to design policy instruments to address 
marginal effects. Another challenge for policy makers is to identify the potential 
effects of new policies where existing management regimes are already in place to 
manage environmental change. Policies may interact in unexpected ways. 
ABARE (2004), for example, noted: 
… increasing water charges when water use is already constrained by regulation may 
simply impose costs without generating any net benefits. (ABARE 2004, p. 6) 
Further, where there is limited measurement and reporting of environmental change, 
it can be difficult to assess whether existing management regimes are meeting 
environmental objectives. If there are several policies addressing the same 
environmental objective, it can also be difficult to distinguish the effectiveness of an 
individual policy. 
An important decision for a policy maker is how much externality to address. It may 
not be efficient to attempt to address the entire externality, and a better approach 
may be to adapt to some level of pollution or environmental effects. The High Level 
Steering Group on Water (2000, p. 7) concluded that the goal should be to ‘achieve 
an efficient and acceptable level of externalities in water resources rather than to 
eliminate such externalities altogether’. An efficient level of externality is achieved 
where the externality is abated (or adapted to) to the point at which the marginal 
cost of additional abatement (or adaption) is equal to the marginal benefit from such 
actions. 
For the assessment and design of new policies to manage externalities, each 
externality needs to be defined beyond simply identifying instances of 
environmental change. Existing environmental ‘standards’ or ‘acceptable levels’ 
can define the point at which a level of environmental change becomes 
unacceptable to society and creates external costs. It may be difficult, however, to 
define an environmental ‘standard’. 
Where irrigators do not meet established environmental ‘standards’, then negative 
externalities may be generated. Where irrigators do more than is required and 
exceed environmental ‘standards’, then they can create positive externalities. Water 
utilities and irrigators should not be required to further address environmental 
change when that change occurs at or below the existing ‘standard’. 
Whom to target 
Policy instruments to address externalities from the supply and use of irrigation 
water could be designed to target:     




•  parties potentially creating environmental changes (such as water utilities and 
irrigators) 
•  parties potentially affected by environmental changes (such as the community 
and recreational users) 
•  intermediaries (such as water utilities, farm input suppliers, farm output 
processors, and managers of recreational facilities) that may be able to influence 
the behaviour of parties potentially creating, and affected by, environmental 
changes. 
Although irrigators may be the source of many types of diffuse pollution, such as 
nutrient discharges into water courses, it may not be efficient and effective to target 
them individually. Where there are a large number of parties creating diffuse 
externalities, it may be more cost-effective to target a small number of 
intermediaries (such as fertiliser companies) who have existing relationships and 
networks with those parties allowing them to more efficiently and effectively 
influence those parties’ behaviours. 
The choice of whom to target has distributional as well as efficiency consequences. 
Clarifying property rights is an important step in determining whether an ‘impactor 
pays’ or ‘beneficiary pays’ approach is adopted. By determining individuals’ 
responsibilities, well-defined property rights implicitly reflect the extent to which 
the community has the right to be free of unwanted consequences of individuals’ 
resource use decisions (Bromley and Hodge 1990). There are no simple efficiency 
grounds for determining how such rights should be allocated in the first instance 
(Coase 1960). Only if it is assumed that those suffering from ‘pollution’ have no 
adaptation options are there efficiency grounds to impose the full costs of pollution 
on the party designated as the ‘polluter’. 
The nature of the policy objective — whether it is restoring past damage and/or 
preventing future damage — may influence the choice of cost sharing model. 
Aretino et al. (2001) concluded that there is little economic rationale to charge 
retrospectively for biodiversity loss, because it is not possible to change past 
behaviour or correct past inefficiencies. Consequently, the efficiency gains from 
applying the ‘impactor pays’ principle may not apply for the case of degradation 
caused by past activities. 
3.5  Efficiency and choice of instrument 
If there is a sufficient case for government intervention, a wide range of options are 
available. One approach to assign a price to externalities is to use taxes, charges or 
subsidies (sometimes referred to as price based instruments). An alternative      





approach is to use quantity based instruments, which restrict the level of outputs or 
inputs. The market may then determine an efficient allocation of resources through 
a tradable permit system (Weitzman 1974). 
There is no a priori reason to favour either price or quantity instruments, because 
the selection of either instrument depends on factors discussed below. Fullerton and 
Metcalf (2001) observed: 
…the same welfare-raising effects of environmental protection can be achieved … by a 
tax that raises revenue, the [command and control] technology restriction that raises no 
revenue, and even a subsidy that costs revenue. (Fullerton and Metcalf 2001, p. 251) 
Factors that influence the choice of policy instrument include the supply and 
demand conditions and the level of uncertainty associated with measuring marginal 
abatement costs and benefits.  
Supply and demand conditions 
Beare and Heaney (2002) compared the relative efficiency of setting a constant tax 
with an equivalent fixed quantity restriction. With fixed demand for water and 
variability in water availability, they demonstrated that both types of instrument 
can, in theory, lead to efficient water allocation (assuming perfect information). 
With fixed supply and variable demand, however, taxes and quantity restrictions are 
not equivalent in terms of economic efficiency. Under these conditions, a fixed tax 
will not affect efficiency of market allocation, while a fixed quantity restriction may 
reduce the level of water use below optimum levels and generate deadweight losses. 
In both cases, the choice of instrument affects the distribution of returns from the 
use of the water allocation. While it is possible to set quantity based restrictions that 
vary with conditions influencing demand, the transactions costs of such a policy are 
likely to be high (Beare and Heaney 2002). 
This analysis assumes that the parties involved are either unable or unwilling to 
negotiate privately, or that any tax charged on one party is returned to the other in a 
way that removes the incentive for further negotiation. Otherwise, if negotiation is 
possible and there is more than one externality producing or mitigating technology, 
a tax does not guarantee a ‘first best’ solution. In this case, an impost on one party 
without returning it as compensation to the other may result in an inefficient 
allocation of resources (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962; Turvey 1963). This 
analysis also assumes certainty about the costs of producing or abating the 
externality.     





Uncertainty is an important consideration when assessing the benefits and costs of 
action. For some externalities, the science to describe the relationship between 
actions and their effects, such as the ecological effects of changing river flows is 
still emerging (chapter 2). This can mean it is difficult to estimate the benefits and 
costs of policy instruments, and there can be uncertainty about the costs of 
abatement and the size and distribution of the marginal benefits. 
Weitzman (1974) examined the choice between a price instrument (a tax or a 
charge) and a quantity instrument such as a tradable permit system. If there is 
uncertainty about the benefits of producing or mitigating an externality, there will 
be uncertainty about the appropriate target level for the charge or quantity 
restriction. This uncertainty does not affect a comparison between taxes/charges and 
quantity instruments — the two instruments give the same (uncertain) result, 
because the result depends on the firms’ abatement costs (Sterner 2003). If, 
however, the costs of producing or abating the externality are uncertain, the relative 
efficiency of the two instruments will differ (Weitzman 1974).  
If the marginal cost of abatement is overestimated, a quantity restriction would be 
less stringent than the optimal one. If, instead, a charge is employed, it would be set 
too high, leading to excessive abatement. As Sterner (2003) notes, the effects of 
over- and under-regulation are not symmetric. If the marginal benefits of abatement 
are flat and the marginal costs of abatement are steep, the efficiency (‘deadweight’) 
losses due to a charge approach would be smaller than those for a quantity 
approach. The opposite is true when the benefit of abatement is steep and the 
marginal cost is flat: the dead weight loss due to a quantity regulation would likely 
be small, while the error caused by a price approach would be large (figure 3.1).  
This analysis tends to suggest that a price instrument is more appropriate when the 
cost of abatement curve is steeper than the benefits curve (Sterner 2003). In 
contrast, when the marginal benefit curve is steep (as a result of environmental 
threshold effects, for example) relative to the marginal cost curve, then quantity 
restrictions are more appropriate (figure 3.1). 
Distributional effects of policy instruments 
In theory, both a tax and a quantity restriction can achieve the same policy goal. The 
choice of instrument, however, will have different distributional effects. With a tax, 
the tax revenues are available to society (the use of such revenues is discussed in 
section 4.2). In contrast, if a quantity measure were used, scarcity rents equal to the 
value of the tax would accrue to the holders of water entitlements, mainly irrigators.      





Figure 3.1  Welfare losses from policy instruments when the costs of 
controlling pollution are uncertain 
Costs are steep relative to benefits  
 
Benefits are steep relative to costs 
 
Source: Derived from Adar and Griffin 1976.  
These distributional consequences may influence the acceptability of the policy. 
Irrigators may prefer a quantity restriction to a tax, because scarcity rents provide 
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3.6  Externality charges and Pigouvian taxes 
An externality charge of an appropriate level can be used to ensure the costs of 
negative externalities are transparent and provide appropriate incentives to 
economic agents. In many (but not all) cases, an externality charge on an input 
reduces the consumption of that input and thereby reduces the negative external 
effects of the input’s use. The divergence between the net social benefits and the net 
private benefits can (but does not necessarily) lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. Such a charge (or corrective tax) on water delivery charges has often 
been proposed as one way to address environmental externalities from water 
harvest, storage, transport and use. The COAG requirements for utility charges to be 
based as full cost recovery, and include the cost of externalities, has been 
interpreted as requiring such a charge to be imposed. 
In general, externality charges based on cost recovery reflect average costs — the 
total cost to be recovered is divided by the volume supplied. However, the marginal 
cost of an externality at the optimum level of output is unlikely to equal the average 
cost. If the marginal cost of the externality is greater than the average cost, an 
externality charge based on average costs will not reduce the level of use to the 
optimum level, but (as discussed later) is likely to increase efficiency. Conversely, 
if the average cost of the externality is greater than the marginal cost, water use will 
be reduced beyond the optimum level. The effect on efficiency will be ambiguous if 
the average cost is substantially above the marginal cost, and there may even be a 
loss of efficiency. 
An optimal (or properly calibrated) Pigouvian tax schedule (after the British 
economist, A.C. Pigou) is equal to the marginal external cost (marginal damage) at 
each level of the various associated activities. In other words, the Pigouvian tax 
schedule inserts, between supply and demand, a tax wedge that is equal to the 
marginal external costs at each quantity. Unlike other taxes, introducing an optimal 
Pigouvian tax does not cause efficiency losses; to the contrary, it normally increases 
efficiency. The economic effect is similar to that of removing a distorting subsidy. 
In box 3.2, imposing a tax of P
* – Pc results in an efficiency gain of the area ABC. 
(Unless explicitly stated otherwise, in this report the term ‘Pigouvian tax’ is used 
for an optimal Pigouvian tax schedule.) In this section, the theoretical effects of 
introducing a Pigouvian tax will be discussed.      






Box 3.2  Market allocation with external costs 
Assume the production of an irrigated commodity involves some externalities 
associated with the use of water. The private marginal benefit for the commodity is 
shown by the curve AD and the private marginal cost of producing the commodity 
(exclusive of externalities) is depicted as PMC. (It has been assumed that only one 
production technology is available and that no other ways of ameliorating the 
externalities are available than embodied in the social marginal cost function SMC. In 
























The social marginal cost function SMC includes both the marginal cost of the 
externalities and the cost of producing the commodity. The marginal cost of the 
externality is the difference between SMC and PMC for a given quantity of production. 
If the only incentives to the producer are those signalled to it by the private opportunity 
costs of producing the commodity given by PMC, the producer would seek to produce 
QC. The social (or external) cost of producing additional units Q
* – QC (area Q
*ABQC) 
exceeds the social value of those additional units (area Q
*ACQC) by the area ABC. 
This means that the area ABC measures the inefficiency caused by the externality, 
through the distortion of the irrigator’s incentives for production of the commodity. 
The net social benefit is maximised at Q
*, which is less than QC. At QC, the market 
price of commodity is PC, which is lower than the optimal price at P
*. If some policy 
instrument or other approach leads to the production of the efficient quantity of Q
*, 
there will be an efficiency gain of ABC. 
Sources: Pearce and Turner 1990; Wills 1997. 
 
 
Pigouvian taxes and dynamic efficiency 
A major advantage of Pigouvian taxes is that irrigators will be responding to the 
correct prices of inputs and outputs. Marginal changes in prices received, or paid, 
are likely to result in marginal changes in output, and in the use of water. This is     




because irrigators are responding to the social (external) cost of water. In contrast, if 
a quantity restriction is chosen, marginal changes in prices paid, or received, are 
only likely to result in changed output and water use if they exceed any scarcity 
rents.  
While both Pigouvian taxes and quantity restrictions need regular review to reflect 
changing economic and environmental conditions, a Pigouvian tax has a greater 
capacity to respond to short term changes in economic conditions than a quantity 
restriction. 
Introducing a Pigouvian tax may ‘crowd out’ some voluntary private sector 
activities. Irrigators who currently undertake voluntary activities to reduce 
externalities may no longer do so once they are paying a tax (Bazin, Ballet and 
Touahri 2004). Or, more generally, as Coase (1960) argued, there may be ‘crowding 
out’ of voluntary actions on the part of those suffering from negative externalities, 
to the detriment of economic efficiency. 
Variation in efficiency benefits 
Introducing a Pigouvian tax will provide the greatest economic benefit when it is set 
at its optimum rate — that is, the marginal cost of the relevant externalities. 
However, there is often uncertainty as to the optimum rate. Nonetheless, a 
Pigouvian tax set below the optimum rate will improve economic efficiency.  
In figure 3.2, if the actual social marginal cost is line SMCA, the unconstrained 
private market outcome reaches equilibrium at G with the quantity of water being 
used (QA) being higher than the efficient (or socially optimal) level (Q
*) at H. If a 
Pigouvian tax is set at TA (the difference between SMCA and PMC at QA), 
efficiency would improve (by the area HEG). 
Assume a government believes that the social marginal cost is SMCB when the 
actual cost is SMCA, and a Pigouvian tax is set at TB (the difference between SMCB 
and PMC at QA). The efficiency gain would be DEGF.  
In general, the marginal efficiency gain from introducing a Pigouvian tax declines 
as the rate approaches the optimum rate. The marginal benefit of increasing the rate 
from TB to TA, for example, is HDF, which is smaller than DEGF.       










































•  In economics, an externality is an activity’s side effects or spillovers that are not 
taken into account in one party’s (whether an individual or business) decision to 
undertake the activity and that affect another party’s wellbeing. 
•  The mere presence of pollution does not necessarily mean there is an externality, 
and the optimal level of pollution is unlikely to be zero.  
•  Incentives for private action to address externalities are stronger when: 
–  the externality is exclusive and there is limited ability to free ride on the 
actions of others 
–  the externality is rivalrous 
–  the costs of identifying the producers of, and those affected by, externalities 
and of measuring the amount of externality produced and its effect, are low. 
•  If private action through the market fails to address the externality, there may be 
a role for government intervention. The presence of an externality does not 
necessarily imply market failure, however, and government intervention may not 
improve the allocation and use of resources. Further, the benefits of any 
proposed government intervention may be less than the costs. 
•  Important criteria for assessing and designing policy instruments are 
appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency. Any analysis needs to consider the     




transaction costs, including information costs to policy design; administration, 
enforcement and monitoring costs incurred by agencies; search and negotiation 
costs incurred by market participants; and compliance costs. 
•  Any proposed policy instrument is likely to be less effective and efficient if its 
design does not consider existing policies to address the externality or if it 
causes unintended distortions in the market. A policy instrument may generate 
perverse incentives and cause changes in behaviour that detract from desired 
outcomes. 
•  A fundamental step in designing policy solutions to environmental problems is 
to be clear on the policy objective.  
–  In designing new policies to manage externalities, analysis needs to go 
beyond simply identifying instances of environmental change.  
–  Existing environmental ‘standards’ can define the point at which a level of 
environmental change becomes unacceptable to society and creates external 
costs. 
•  The choice of whom to target has distributional consequences, and the cost 
sharing choice once property rights and responsibilities are established can have 
efficiency implications. 
•  If there is uncertainty about the marginal costs of producing or reducing an 
externality, the relative efficiency of taxes/charges and quantity based 
instruments will vary: 
–  A price instrument is likely to be more efficient when the marginal costs of 
abatement curve is steeper than the marginal benefits curve. 
–  A quantity instrument is likely to be more efficient when the marginal 
benefits curve is steeper than the marginal costs of abatement curve. 
•  An externality charge based on cost recovery will, in general reflect average 
costs rather than marginal costs. 
–  If the average cost is less than the marginal costs, water use may not be 
reduced to the optimum level, but efficiency is likely to increase. 
–  If the average cost is greater than the marginal cost, water use will be reduced 
beyond its optimum level and there may even be a loss in efficiency. 
•  Introducing an externality charge equal to the marginal external cost at each 
level of the various associated activities (an optimal Pigouvian tax): 
–  will equate the marginal private benefit and the marginal social (external) 
cost from an activity. Once achieved, this equilibrium implies that the 
marginal benefits to society from further reducing the externality will be less 
than the marginal costs      





–  might provide an incentive for the private sector to undertake abatement 
activities where these cost are less than the tax, if the private sector expects 
the level of tax in the future to adapt to the reduced external costs from 
abatement activities  
–  might reduce the activities that cause the externalities in some cases. If 
demand is relatively inelastic, however, imposing a Pigouvian tax may have 
little effect on the quantity demanded 
–  might ‘crowd out’ some voluntary private sector activities 
–  will have distributional consequences, and  
–  will require a great deal of data to properly design and calibrate the tax.     





4  Implementing an externality charge 
for irrigation water 
This chapter builds on the concepts introduced in chapters 2 and 3 and discusses 
issues involved in considering whether to implement an externality charge on 
irrigation water. The effects of imposing a charge or tax on water use when water 
supplies are constrained to varying degrees, and when irrigators face different 
market conditions for water, are discussed in section 4.1. Drawing on the 
framework developed in chapter 2, section 4.2 examines issues in designing a tax, 
including the suitability of a Pigouvian tax for addressing a particular externality, 
possible interaction with other externalities, determining the rate of a tax on 
irrigation water, the use of a tax to raise revenue, the use of tax revenues and the 
legal feasibility of a tax.  
4.1  Effects of a tax on irrigator water use 
Many factors can influence the effect of a tax on irrigators’ use of water, including:  
•  existing mechanisms to address externalities 
•  the volume of water allocated to irrigators 
•  the extent to which trade can occur  
•  the size of the tax 
•  the price responsiveness for irrigation water.  
There are many existing measures aimed at reducing externalities, including 
quantity restrictions (or constraints), and cost recovery for environmental activities 
undertaken by water utilities (chapter 1). In the southern Murray–Darling Basin, for 
example, the use of irrigation water is restricted by the ‘Cap’. The Cap imposes a 
limit on the volume of water that can be diverted from rivers for consumptive uses. 
Irrigators can trade unused seasonal allocations and entitlements, with the market 
price of seasonal allocations often exceeding the utility supply charges. Thus, 
holders of water entitlements can earn scarcity rents (box 4.1). Appels, Douglas and 
Dwyer (2004) observed significant spatial and temporal variations in scarcity rents:     




over the past three years, scarcity rents ranged from $50 per megalitre to $500 per 
megalitre.  
In this section, the effects of a tax are considered when water supply is constrained 
for the cases of (1) no trade and (2) trade in irrigators’ allocations of water.  
 
Box 4.1  Quantity restrictions and scarcity rents  
The ability to trade in unused seasonal allocations and entitlements, in the presence of 
restrictions on the availability of water can result in the market price of water exceeding 
the utility charges, generating scarcity rents for the holders of water entitlements 
(mainly irrigators).  
In the simple diagram below, with water restricted to Q
*, at the equilibrium of P
* and Q
* 
the scarcity rent per unit of water is P
* – PU (where PU is the utility charge). The value 
























   
 
A tax when there is no water trade 
Without water trade, the initial allocation of water is likely to be suboptimal. The 
absence of trade means irrigators who could profitably use more water than they 
have been allocated are unable to purchase it, while other irrigators who cannot 
profitably use all their allocation cannot derive scarcity rents by selling it. 
In the case of no trade, the effect of a tax on the quantity of water delivered to farms 
depends on the size of the tax, the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve and the 
total quantity of water allocated to irrigators (box 4.2).     





If an irrigator would, in the absence of the tax, use their full allocation and would 
prefer a larger allocation, a tax will reduce the total volume of water used only if it 
is large enough to reduce the marginal benefits of water use (after the tax) to below 
the utility charge. Responses by some irrigators are likely to be small or zero unless 
the charge is very high. A green tea farmer, for example, could face a reduction in 
profit if using even marginally less water significantly reduces the quality of their 
crop. This irrigator is likely to continue to demand the same amount of water from 
utilities to meet the quality standards — despite the externality charge — except in 
very wet seasons. Charges that are high enough to influence water use may involve 
significant adjustment costs. 
 
Box 4.2  Effect of a tax on the volume of water used by irrigators 
Assuming zero trade 
In situation (i), where an irrigator is initially using full allocations (Qi = Qalloc) at a utility 
charge of Pu, a tax of t1 shifts down the aggregate demand curve from AD to AD1. 
However, a tax of t1 will not reduce the volume of water used (Q1 = Qi). A tax of t2, 
which shifts the aggregate demand curve to AD2 is large enough to reduce the demand 
for water, making the quantity of water used (Q2) less than Qalloc. 
In situation (ii), an irrigator is initially using less than the full allocation (Q3 < Qalloc). A 
tax of any size will reduce the total volume of water used; with a tax equal to t3, water 
use is reduced to Q4. 
































   
 
If another irrigator is initially using less than their full allocation of water, however, 
a tax of any size will reduce total water use. The magnitude of water use reductions 
depends on the elasticity of demand, which is likely to vary across industries, 
regions and seasons (Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004). 
The use of water by irrigators relative to their allocations is likely to change in 
response to many factors, including seasonal conditions and the relative prices of     




their produce (Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004). In a wet season, the demand for 
water is likely to be low relative to supply and more irrigators may use less than 
their full allocations. In this situation, more irrigators are likely to respond to an 
externality charge by reducing their water use. On the other hand, relatively high 
prices of their produce could lead to more irrigators using all their allocation. In this 
situation, fewer irrigators are likely to respond to an externality charge by reducing 
their water use. 
A tax when there is water trade 
If trade in water occurs, the use of water is likely to be more efficient than in the 
case of no water trade, as water and other resources can be put to their highest value 
uses. Where a quantity restriction is binding and scarcity rents exist, an externality 
tax is unlikely to change the volumes of water traded or used on farms unless the 
tax exceeds the scarcity rents from trading the water. Irrigators will respond to the 
tax by reducing their demand for water, but also by increasing their supply. A small 
tax could result in a fall in the market price, but not necessarily affect patterns of 
water use (box 4.3). 
In a wet season, if there are no restrictions to trade, it may be difficult to determine 
a tax’s effect on patterns of water use across irrigation districts that trade with each 
other. Irrigators in one region may respond by decreasing water use, but sell their 
allocations, possibly resulting in increased water use in other regions. 
Where there is a market for water (with sufficient participants), the effect of a tax 
on water use depends on: 
•  the size of the tax 
•  the relative slopes and positions of the aggregate water supply and demand 
curves before and after the tax (which, in turn, depend on the net private 
marginal benefits to individual irrigators of using water on-farm). 
A tax imposed per unit on water delivered to farms reduces the marginal benefits of 
using water on farm (net of utility charges and taxes).  
As illustrated in box 4.3, if a tax is sufficiently large (or the market price was zero 
without the tax, such as in a year with abundant rainfall), the market price of water 
could fall to zero with the tax. Less water will be traded and the overall quantity of 
water used by irrigators will fall. As ABARE noted:  
An important consideration for introducing charges for externalities is that the 
externality charge will only reduce the quantity of water demanded if the imposition of 
this charge removes any existing scarcity rents. (ABARE 2004, p. 2)     






Box 4.3  Total demand versus market demand for water 
An irrigator’s demand for water is based on their net marginal private benefits (NMPB) 
gained from water use. For simplicity, it is assumed that utility charges are zero, so the 
‘market price’ of traded water reflects scarcity rents available to holders of water 
allocations. At price Pa, the individual demands the full allocation (qalloc) and does not 
supply water to the market. Above Pa the irrigator supplies water to the market — for 
example, at P1, the irrigator uses q1, and sells (supplies) the balance of their allocation 
in the market (quantity supplied = qalloc – q1). If the price rises to P2 or above, the 
irrigator supplies all of their water to the market (quantity supplied = qalloc). If, however, 
the price is below Pa (such as P3), the irrigator increases water use to q3, by 
supplementing the allocation with water purchases (quantity demanded = q3 – qalloc). 







































Aggregate demand and supply of traded water (the sum of all individual demands and 
supplies) shift down by the size of the tax when a tax is applied. In situation (i), where 
the price (P
*) is initially positive, a tax of t1 (which is less than P
*) results in the price 
falling by t1. There is no change in the quantity of water traded (Q
*). Because each 
irrigator’s NMPB curves also fall by t1, the tax does not have an allocative effect. The 
irrigator still uses q
* and buys q
* – qalloc in the market. 
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Box 4.3  (continued) 
In situation (ii), where the market price (P
*) is initially positive, a tax of t2 (where t2 > P
*) 
results in the market price falling to zero. The quantity of water traded falls to Q2. Given 
that fewer unused allocations are being traded, a tax of t2 results in a reduction in the 
total quantity of water used. Some individual irrigators who (before the tax) could sell 
their unused allocations will (after the tax) be unable to sell some (or all) of their 
unused allocations. As a result of a tax t2, the individual irrigator shown below reduces 
their water use from q
* to q2. 














































In situation (iii), where the price (P
*) is initially zero and only unused water allocations 
are being sold, a tax of any size results in fewer unused water allocations being traded 
and a reduction in overall water use. 





















   
 
Consequently, an individual irrigator is likely to be willing to supply water at a 
market price lower than that which existed before the charge. (The maximum 
volume that an individual can supply is limited by their initial allocation.) An 
irrigator is also likely to demand water only at a lower market price (box 4.3). 
Nonetheless, introducing such a tax will ensure irrigators respond to the economic 
price of water.      





If the quantity traded or used by individual irrigators does not change, there will not 
be any immediate improvement in economic efficiency from a tax (the quantity 
restriction in fact has constrained demand equal to, or lower than, the socially 
optimal level) — (although the tax itself is an efficient way of raising government 
revenue).  
Even if a tax does not improve efficiency in the short term, it might provide 
incentives for dynamic efficiency improvements — irrigators might undertake 
abatement activities if they expect the level of tax in the future to adapt to the 
reduced external costs from abatement activities. 
Distributional effects 
Introducing an externality charge, as for all taxes, will have distributional effects. 
When there is a binding constraint on available water, distributional changes can be 
the main outcome, as noted by ABARE: 
The possibility exists that if demand is not particularly responsive to price changes, 
then attempts to deal with externalities through volumetric charges will only transfer 
income from irrigators to the government with no perceived benefits to society, unless 
the revenue generated is invested in mitigating infrastructure. (ABARE 2004, p. 19) 
An implication of a reduction in the income of irrigators is that their net wealth 
would be reduced. The size of annual scarcity rents are likely to be an important 
component of the value of water entitlements. A reduction in scarcity rents because 
of a tax will reduce the value of the water entitlement.  
ABARE (2004) noted that some irrigators may prefer the use of regulation to reduce 
water use, rather than a tax: 
Regulation … may … be the preferred option for irrigators. For instance, if a 
volumetric charge is needed to raise the price of water considerably before it will 
induce a management change … it may have been cheaper for irrigators to be regulated 
in order to manage the externality rather than pay the higher price for water. 
(ABARE 2004, pp. 16–17) 
If governments use regulation to reduce water use (box 4.4), scarcity rents from 
holding water entitlements are likely to increase, and therefore the value of the 
entitlements themselves will also increase. In the short run, if the demand for 
irrigation water is inelastic, the resultant increase in scarcity rents might increase 
irrigators’ wealth, even after accounting for a reduction in entitlements.     




4.2  Issues in designing a tax 
Drawing on the framework for analysing externalities associated with 
environmental change developed in chapter 2, this section considers issues in 
designing a tax on water use, including the suitability of an externality, the 
interactions with other externalities, challenges in determining the rate, use of such 
a tax to raise revenue, the use of the tax revenues and the legal feasibility.  
Suitability of tax to an externality  
Introducing a tax may be an appropriate policy tool for some, but not all, 
externalities. The objective of an externality charge or tax is to signal to the party 
undertaking the activity creating the externality the marginal social cost of that 
activity. An externality charge is most likely to achieve its objectives where there 
are clear links between the activity being taxed and the externality. In some cases, it 
may be easier to tax a proxy for the activity causing an externality rather than the 
activity itself (a ‘presumptive’ tax). It is easier to tax petroleum fuels, for example, 
than to directly tax exhaust emissions, and there is a clear relationship between the 
use of fuel and emissions (OECD 1996). As identified in chapter 2 there may be 
little direct relationship between the use of irrigation water and some externalities 
(for example, cold water pollution and flow regulation). However, with careful 
design, the indirect links may in some cases be sufficient to include the marginal 
cost of such externalities into a charge on water use.  
Some commentators have proposed taxes on agricultural products as the base of an 
environmental charge (box 4.5). However, as the OECD cautioned: 
Where the linkage between the tax base [or activity causing the externality] and the 
environmental damage is weak, the tax may fail to induce polluters to change their 
behaviour, and the tax may simply become the cause of more market distortions. 
(OECD 1996, p. 20) 
A tax used to signal the marginal social cost of the activity creating the externality, 
is suited to externalities where the external costs are related to the level of activity 
(that is, marginal costs for each unit of output), rather than those having costs that 
are invariant to activity. (This assumes that there is nothing the person adversely 
affected by the environmental change can do to reduce costs, see box 3.1). Thus a 
Pigouvian tax might be suited to some irrigation water supply and use externalities 
(such an instream salinity). It is less suited to other externalities, such as 
obstructions to fish migration, which create an externality with their existence, 
regardless of the level of water use. Table 4.1 draws on the discussion of externality 
characteristics in chapter 2 to provide examples of negative effects that are/are not 
related to irrigation water use.     






Box 4.4  Changing the ‘Cap’ alters the value of scarcity rents 
If the amount of water available for allocation is reduced then the value of scarcity rents 
































At the initial equilibrium of P
* and Q
* the scarcity rent net of utility charges per unit of 
water is P
* – PU (where PU is the utility charge) and the value of holdings is P
*ABPU. If 
the ‘Cap’ on water allocations is reduced from Q
* to Q
# then the increase in the scarcity 
rent depends on the characteristics of demand.  
If, for example, demand was relatively elastic (AD1), then the price would rise to P1, the 
scarcity rent to P1 – PU, and the net value of water holdings would fall to P1ECPU 
(because ABCD is lost, while the smaller area P1EDP
* is gained).  
If demand is inelastic (AD2), then the price would rise to P2, the scarcity rent would 
increase to P2 – PU, and the net value of holdings would increase to P2FCPU (because 
the area ABCD is lost, but the larger area P2FDP
* is gained). Water demand is 
generally considered to be relatively inelastic, suggesting that a small reduction of the 
‘Cap’ may increase the total value of water holdings. 
 
 
Interaction with other externalities  
In designing any tax it is important to take into account any potential unintended 
consequences. Irrigation water supply and use can have both positive and negative 
externalities (chapter 2). Thus a tax related to negative externalities that reduces     




water use might have the unintended consequence of also reducing positive 
externalities. Water losses from the conveyance of irrigation water, for example, 
may benefit local producers by providing water through return flows and improve 
the functioning of natural ecosystems.  
 
Box 4.5  Alternative tax approaches 
The efficiency gains associated with Pigouvian taxes may not be achieved by other 
‘environmental’ taxes. Environment Victoria, for example, has proposed a levy on 
goods produced from water drawn from the River Murray: 
… a river health levy on products, such as dairy foods, could contribute to the $1 billion the 
waterway needs to survive. … Supermarkets and food processors that make profits off the 
back of agricultural products grown from Murray river water should put something back into 
the river. (Environment Victoria 2005, p. 1) 
It appears that the purpose of the levy is to provide revenue for environmental 
expenditure, rather than to reduce the use of irrigation water. The economic incidence 
of the tax is unlikely to be on supermarkets and food processors. A tax imposed on a 
business is either passed on to consumers as higher prices; input suppliers (including 
employees) as lower prices for inputs; or shareholders as lower dividends. Export 
markets largely determine the market prices of much agricultural produce (such as 
dairy products), so it is unlikely that much of the levy will be passed on to consumers. 
Rather, it is likely that much of the levy will be passed back to farmers as lower prices 
for their outputs. This might indirectly reduce overall water use to the extent that it 
results in farmers producing less agricultural output. While both a Pigouvian tax and 
the proposed levy are likely to reduce farmers’ incomes, in general the Pigouvian tax 
will encourage more efficient use of irrigation water. 
 
 
An externality charge might also encourage actions that have a detrimental effect on 
the environment and longer term production, such as excess pumping of 
groundwater or the installation of farm dams to capture surface runoff before it 
enters river and groundwater systems. Many States have regulations, however, that 
limit the ability of irrigators to further access groundwater or build more farm dams 
for irrigation (Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004). 
Determining the rate of a Pigouvian tax on irrigation water 
The most difficult task in determining the rate for a Pigouvian tax on the use of 
irrigation is estimating the marginal costs of externalities (the volume of expected 
use is likely to be known by a water utility). This task is made more difficult by two 
factors: 
•  the marginal costs of externalities vary across locations and times 
•  limited information on the marginal costs of externalities.     





Table 4.1  Relationship between externalities and changes to 
irrigation water use  
Relationship between effect and the volume and timing of 
irrigation water usea  Examples of effect 
Effect occurs regardless of the timing and volume of irrigation 
water use 
Obstructed fish passage 
Effect is indirectly related to the timing and volume of irrigation 
water use, which influences the operation of the supply system 
Cold water pollution 
Flow regulation 
Delivery losses 
Effect is related to the timing and volume of irrigation water use  Instream salinity 
Waterlogging on farm 
a These relationships vary with location and time. 
Variation across locations and times 
An ideal Pigouvian tax would feature differing rates across different locations and 
times, reflecting the changing costs of externalities over location and time 
(chapter 2). The way in which water use (and the externality charge) should vary 
depends on the characteristics of the externality (or externalities), and on the 
characteristics of water demand for different irrigators (Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 
2004).  
Water utility charges already vary according to location, both between and within 
utilities. Goulburn-Murray Water, for example, had seven charging zones for 
gravity water in 2004–05. In most cases a single utility is responsible for the use of 
irrigation water in an individual valley or irrigation district. The marginal economic 
cost of externalities associated with the use of irrigation water could be estimated 
for each valley or district where irrigation is significant. Where valleys or districts 
are interconnected (as in the southern Murray–Darling Basin), externalities can 
occur across these valleys or districts. Therefore it is necessary to consider 
externalities across the entire network, rather than just those that may affect an 
individual valley or district. While spatial differences in the cost of an externality 
within valleys could also be estimated, it would be desirable that such estimates are 
based on the charging zones of the relevant utility. Unless the spatial costs of a 
particular externality are known to vary significantly within a valley, the costs of 
gathering the information to allow differential charging within a valley may 
outweigh the benefits. 
Most irrigators have to ‘order’ the delivery of irrigation water from their utility. In 
such cases, it is possible to design tax rates that would vary within a year (perhaps 
on a weekly or monthly basis). However, unless there is a significant difference in 
the cost of externalities between time periods, there may be little benefit in 
imposing a Pigouvian tax with a rate varied within a year. Further, because     




irrigators can alter the timing of ordering water, there may be unintended 
consequences, such as a surge in orders for water immediately before an announced 
price increase. 
Limited information on the marginal costs of externalities 
Information deficiencies make it unlikely that the marginal costs of externalities 
associated with the use of irrigation water can be accurately determined 
(OECD 1996). In Australia, for example, there appear to be few studies that would 
provide policy makers with an indication of the likely level of a tax. In the absence 
of such information, it will be difficult to calibrate (set a near-optimal) Pigouvian 
tax. Caution should be exercised in setting the rate, as too high a tax rate may lead 
to efficiency losses, rather than gains.  
Review of tax rate 
The rate of tax should be regularly reviewed, for three reasons. First, the marginal 
costs of externalities are likely to change over time. In the short run, firms may 
reduce production of the commodity using water and/or change their input mix. In 
the long run, firms may choose to introduce changes in technology or to relocate 
their enterprises, reducing the social cost of using irrigation water as well as the 
private production costs (OECD 1996). Second, better estimates of the marginal 
costs of externalities may become available, which may lead to a revised tax rate. 
Third, regular reviews should provide incentive over the longer term for irrigators to 
consider ways of reducing externalities for a given level of water use (if the 
marginal costs of abatement are less than the marginal reduction in externality). If 
the tax rate is fixed, there may be less incentive for abatement. 
Use of a tax to raise revenue 
Assuming the demand for irrigation water is relatively inelastic in the short term 
(Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004), imposing a tax on irrigation water may appear 
to be an efficient means of raising revenue beyond that justified to correct an 
externality. Ramsay  (1927) proposed that it would be economically efficient to 
impose taxes on commodities at rates proportional to the sum of the reciprocals of 
the elasticities of demand and supply of final consumption goods — that is, a 
relatively high rate of tax could be imposed on commodities with inelastic demand 
without having large effects on economic efficiency.  
When considering Ramsay’s proposition, three further factors need to be 
considered. First, Ramsay’s general proposition applied to taxes on final     





consumption (in his words, ‘uses of income’), not taxes on intermediate inputs. 
Stiglitz (1988, p. 499) considered the case where a tax (other than a Pigouvian tax) 
falls on both intermediate and final consumption: ‘whenever a commodity is used 
both by businesses and consumers and the tax is imposed on both (businesses are 
not exempted), there is a loss in productive efficiency’. Stiglitz did not argue that 
taxes (other than a Pigouvian tax) should never be imposed on intermediate inputs, 
but rather that such taxes should be imposed only when they are the most efficient 
method of achieving a policy goal. Where excises (whose main purpose is to raise 
revenue) are currently levied on business inputs in Australia (for example, excises 
on petroleum products), the Australian Government rebates some of the excise to 
certain businesses (for example, agriculture and transport).  
Second, Ramsay proposed imposing taxes on all final consumption goods, not just 
those with low elasticities. Imposing taxes on some consumption goods, but not 
others, would increase efficiency losses. Third, Ramsay specifically excluded 
consideration of the distributional effect of such taxes. If it were assumed that 
irrigation water is mainly used to produce food, and that producers can pass on 
some of the tax to consumers, the resultant price increases would fall more heavily 
on low income households than high income households. A more likely effect 
(assuming that marginal Australian agricultural production is exported) is that 
producers could not pass on cost increases to consumers in the short run, and the tax 
would fall on farm households.  
A final consideration is the possibility of ‘cascading’ taxes — that is, when taxes 
are imposed at multiple points in the production chain, leading to ‘taxes on taxes’. 
A cascading of taxes is undesirable because it tends to magnify the efficiency losses 
that result from most taxes. Given that the purpose of a Pigouvian tax is to ensure 
producers react to a price that includes social costs, the tax ensures the affected 
input is correctly priced; then, imposing a Pigouvian tax that correctly reflects social 
costs does not cause efficiency losses. If, however, the tax were imposed at too high 
a rate (perhaps reflecting uncertainty about the valuation of an externality), the 
excess component might lead to efficiency losses, which could increase if cascading 
then occurred. An exception would be if producer demand for the taxed input were 
inelastic, in which case no efficiency loss would occur.  
Use of tax revenue 
Assuming a tax were imposed, what are the options for the revenue? One option, 
referred to as the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis, may be to use the revenue raised to 
reduce, or retire, an existing and inefficient revenue raising tax. Proponents of the 
‘double dividend’ hypothesis argue that the economy would benefit from the     




correction of the implicit subsidy associated with the externality, and also from the 
reduction in deadweight losses associated with the existing distorting tax.  
Such a response, however, could prompt irrigators and others to question why the 
proceeds of a tax being imposed to correct an environmental problem were not 
being spent to correct the externality. A externality tax may be more acceptable to 
irrigators (and others) if the revenue is ‘hypothecated’ to (or earmarked for) 
environmental problems associated with the externality (ABARE  2004). 
Hypothecation could thus increase the tax’s acceptability in those cases where 
associated expenditure could reduce tax levels in the future. Consider an externality 
associated with salinity: if the tax revenue funds a salt interception scheme, the 
externality could be diminished (or cease) once the scheme was completed, and the 
tax could then be reduced (or removed). In some cases, however, the revenue may 
not be easily used to reduce an externality (for example, where the externality is 
associated with water storages). 
Several factors require careful policy consideration if a decision is made to 
hypothecate environmental taxes. First, the revenue raised by a tax may be more, or 
less, than the optimal level of expenditure on remedying and/or preventing 
environmental damage. Further, a hypothecated tax may tend to ‘crowd out’ both 
government and private expenditure on an environmental externality — the tax and 
associated expenditures could be perceived as having ‘fixed’ the problem (Bazin, 
Ballet and Touahri 2004).  
The annual revenue raised by an environmental tax is likely to vary with the use of 
irrigation water between years. A tax of (say) $1 per megalitre might raise up to 
$16.7 million, assuming water use in agriculture of about 16 700 gigalitres (which 
was the use in 2000-01, the latest non-drought year where data are available). This 
estimate is likely to be an upper bound; demand for water in some locations is likely 
to respond to the price change from the tax. However, water use in agriculture, and 
therefore potential revenues, was 37 per cent lower in 2002-03 due to drought. The 
variation in water use is likely to be greater within some individual valleys and 
irrigation schemes.  
Legal feasibility 
The legal distinctions between, and constitutional provisions for, taxes, excises and 
charges have important implications for environmental taxes, charges and 
regulations. The definition of taxation terms has been the subject of debate, 
particularly from a legal perspective. The Australian Constitution and case law 
require different types of government impost to have certain characteristics, to meet     





the legal definitions of tax, charge and excise. A government impost that fails to 
satisfy the relevant legal definition may be challenged and declared invalid. 
Only the Australian (Commonwealth) Government can impose an excise duty 
(s. 90,  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900). The High Court has 
defined an excise duty as: 
duties of excise are taxes on the production, manufacture, sale or distribution of goods, 
whether of foreign or domestic origin. Duties of excise are inland taxes in 
contradistinction from duties of customs which are taxes on the importation of goods. 
(Ha v State of New South Wales 1997 368) 
Irrigation water is used in the production process, and therefore a tax imposed on 
irrigation water may be considered an excise duty. If this were the case, the States 
and Territories could not legally impose such a tax. 
An important limit on the Australian Government’s taxing powers is that taxes must 
not discriminate between States, or parts of States (s. 51(ii), Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900). A tax that attempted to levy differential rates of 
taxation to reflect regional differences in the size of externalities may thus face legal 
challenges. Environmental taxes that have different impacts on different states or 
parts of states may not be considered discriminatory if their different impacts are 
clearly based on differences in environmental conditions or in environmental 
impacts from the taxed activity, but the legal position on such taxes has not been 
clearly defined to date. 
While these restrictions may make the introduction of a tax more difficult, there are 
precedents that may assist in design: 
•  In 1997, the High Court ruled that the New South Wales tobacco licence fee was 
an excise duty (Ha v the State of New South Wales; Walter Hammond v the State 
of New South Wales 1997). The decision invalidated many State and Territory 
franchise and licence fees, particularly on alcohol and tobacco. Since that date, 
the Australian Government has imposed excise duties on alcohol and tobacco, 
and remitted the revenue to State and Territory governments.  
•  The Australian Government imposes uniform excise duties on diesel fuel. 
Nonetheless, the Energy Grants Credit Scheme (an expenditure measure) 
provides rebates for diesel used by vehicles with a gross vehicle mass between 
4.5 and 20 tonnes when used outside ‘metropolitan areas’. 
The Victorian Government recently announced it will require water utilities to: 
… contribute funding towards water related initiatives that seek to promote the 
sustainable management of water and to address adverse impacts to the environment 
associated with its use.     




It is proposed that each authority will be required to pay an annual environmental 
contribution based on a percentage of its existing revenues. Once this amount has been 
determined, this will become a fixed amount that the authority will be required to pay 
annually over four years. (Victorian Government 2004, p. 129) 
The Victorian Government expects water utilities to pass this charge onto water 
users.  
This is likely to increase prices by an average of five per cent for urban water 
customers and two per cent for rural customers. (Victorian Government 2004, p. 129) 
The main feature of this arrangement that may distinguish it from an excise tax is 
that it is a fixed charge based on the past revenues of individual utilities. 
Constitutional validity is a complex issue which would require close consideration 
of all aspects of the legislative scheme. 
4.3 Summary 
•  A number of factors can influence the effect of a tax or charge on irrigators’ use 
of water, including the volume of water allocated to irrigators, seasonal 
conditions, the extent to which trade can occur, the size of the tax and the price 
responsiveness of demand for irrigation water.  
•  Responses to an externality tax would vary across irrigators, across irrigation 
districts, within seasons and from year to year.  
•  A tax will not necessarily result in changes to water use, because it affects both 
the irrigator’s demand for water and their supply to the water market. 
•  If, however, the market prices of water with and without the tax are positive (that 
is, scarcity rents exist without and with the tax), a tax will have no influence on 
the quantity of water traded or used by individual irrigators. 
•  To the extent that scarcity rents vary over time, such a tax might improve 
efficiency at times when these rents are less than the tax. 
A tax could be an appropriate policy tool for some, but not all, externalities. In 
general, such a tax will be most appropriate where the marginal cost of an 
externality is directly related to the use of irrigation water, and nothing else. An 
externalities tax will be less appropriate where there is little link between the 
externality and the use of irrigation water. 
•  Determining the optimal rate of a tax is difficult due to differences in the 
marginal costs across locations and times and limited information on the 
marginal cost of externalities. 
•  Once the rate of a tax is determined, it should be regularly reviewed.      





•  Allocating revenue from (‘hypothecating’) a tax to address environmental 
problems associated with the externality would require careful policy 
consideration. The revenue raised by such a tax may be higher, or lower, than 
the optimal level of expenditure on the environmental externality. A 
hypothecated tax may also tend to ‘crowd out’ both government and private 
expenditures on the environmental problem. However, using the revenue raised 
to address the externality is likely to make such a tax more acceptable.  
•  Imposing an externality tax or charge that has the features of an excise tax might 
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A Irrigated  agriculture 
This appendix discusses the costs of irrigation water (section A.1) and the operation 
of markets for trading water in Australia (section A.2). A clear distinction is drawn 
between prices or charges for water paid by irrigators to utilities, and market prices 
paid for seasonal allocations and water entitlements. Information from 
Goulburn-Murray Water, a water utility in the southern Murray–Darling Basin, is 
used to illustrate the operation of irrigation water supply and use systems. 
A.1  Economic costs and water charges 
In supplemented irrigation districts, utilities charge irrigators for the water allocated 
and/or delivered to farms. These charges do not represent all the economic costs 
associated with the supply and use of irrigation water — the charges include some 
of the costs of supply but not the costs associated with use. Supply costs can 
include: 
•  cost of capital of the infrastructure 
•  operational and maintenance costs of supply, including infrastructure 
maintenance and delivery operations 
•  environmental management costs and third party effects associated with the 
supply (externalities) 
•  costs associated with managing congestion 
•  losses in water volumes from storing and delivering the water. 
Utility charges are designed primarily to recover operational, maintenance and some 
capital costs. They do not reveal the opportunity costs of water use.  
Charging regimes vary across irrigation districts in the southern Murray–Darling 
Basin. Several utilities, including Goulburn-Murray Water and Murray Irrigation 
Limited, charge irrigators a two-part tariff consisting of: 
•  a fixed component — charges based on the volume of water specified to be the 
irrigator’s water right or entitlement 
•  a variable component — charges on either the volume of water allocated or 
delivered during the irrigation season.     




In some irrigation districts, these charges are further differentiated across local 
districts to reflect the relative costs to the utility of storing and delivering irrigation 
water to each district. For example, Goulburn-Murray Water’s 2003-04 fixed and 
variable charges for gravity irrigation varied across the eight irrigation districts that 
it supplies: 
•  the infrastructure access (fixed) charge (for each megalitre of water entitlement) 
varied from $13.20 for the Pyramid Hill-Boort district to $23.22 for the 
Shepparton irrigation district 
•  the infrastructure use (variable) charge (for each megalitre of water used) varied 
from $5.62 for Shepparton to $11.05 for the Campaspe irrigation district. 
Different jurisdictions take different approaches in charging for costs associated 
with environmental management activities. For example, in South Australia and the 
ACT, explicit environmental management charges are levied on the amount of 
water consumed. Other jurisdictions do not appear to have an explicit charge for 
environmental management costs. Some utilities have explicit levies for these costs: 
for example, Murrumbidgee Irrigation Limited charged irrigators $145 per year to 
recover costs of running its Envirowise program (DNRE 2001). Most utilities 
appear to incorporate the costs they incur in managing environmental and natural 
resources in general supply charges. 
ANCID (2002) estimated that in 2001, the average charge for irrigation water by 
utilities was $23.51 per megalitre, ignoring fixed supply charges — the last 
megalitre delivered is generally charged the same as the first megalitre delivered. 
Historically, subject to water availability, irrigators have been able to purchase 
water in excess of their allocation at the same supply price as their seasonal 
allocations (in wet years, for example, water managers may set allocations above 
100 per cent allowing irrigators requiring additional water to purchase the 
differential as an excess but in proportion to their base entitlement). 
A.2  Trade in irrigation water 
Depending on the pattern and scale, water trading may be a key factor in 
determining externalities of water supply and use, and in assessing and 
implementing potential management options. In a market where water is freely 
traded among competing users (including non irrigators), the clearing price will 
reflect the private opportunity cost of the water. The full or social opportunity cost 
of water will be the difference between the marginal benefit that could be gained by 
using the water and the marginal costs of supplying the water together with 
marginal external costs associated with the supply and use of the water (Beare and 
Heaney 2002; Rogers, Bhatia and Huber 1998).      




Irrigators can purchase water from utilities, and trade seasonal water allocations and 
the underlying long term water entitlements. Trade in water allocations, sometimes 
referred to as ‘temporary trade’, occurs when irrigators trade all or portions of their 
seasonal allocation to other irrigators (usually within the same irrigation area or 
utility supply district). Trade in water entitlements, sometimes referred to as 
‘permanent trade’, occurs when entitlements to future water supplies are traded 
from one party to another party. In the three major irrigation districts of the southern 
Murray–Darling Basin (the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, the Murray Irrigation 
district and the Goulburn-Murray Water district), trade in water allocations 
accounted for around 20 per cent of total allocations, while trade in water 
entitlements accounted for less than 2 per cent in 2002-03 (Appels, Douglas and 
Dwyer 2004). 
Restrictions on the trade of irrigation water are a key reason why both allocation 
and entitlement prices are unlikely to reflect the full opportunity cost of water. 
Regulatory or administrative restrictions are imposed at both the regional and State 
level to retain water within irrigation systems due to concerns about the 
consequences of water rights being traded out of certain areas (for example, Appels, 
Douglas and Dwyer 2004; Bell and Blias 2002; and Goesch 2001).  
Some restrictions on trade are also imposed for environmental concerns, including 
for the maintenance of wetland biodiversity and the management of salinity. Other 
restrictions reflect physical congestion constraints, which limit the volume and rate 
at which water is able to flow through sections of the supply network. Sometimes 
these restrictions may be inter-related, such as congestion constraints also having 
environmental implications. For example, the flow capacity of the River Murray is 
reduced to around 8500 megalitres per day through the Barmah Choke as flows in 
excess of this cause flooding of the surrounding red gum forest. Flows through the 
Barmah Choke are controlled to prevent environmental effects that would be caused 
by unseasonal flooding. 
Trade of allocations 
Irrigators can capture rents by trading unused seasonal allocations when the market 
price of seasonal allocations exceed the utility supply charges. Rents can accrue 
during a season as irrigators hold unused seasonal allocation and other sources of 
water become scarce. Prices in the southern Murray–Darling Basin for seasonal 
allocations rose significantly during the recent drought, for example, and traded 
well above utility charges. At other times rents may be zero or even negative during 
flood periods or after harvests, for example, when utility charges may exceed the 
marginal value and traded price of water.     




The trade of seasonal allocations has grown substantially in the past decade, 
partially reflecting changes to water property right regimes, which have separated 
the water right from the irrigators land title (Tisdell, Ward and Grudzinski 2001). 
Goulburn-Murray Water, for example, recorded total traded volumes for the district 
of less than 40 gigalitres annually between 1989-90 and 1993-94 (when the water 
reforms were enacted), while trades in 2001-02 exceeded 250 gigalitres 
(Bjornlund 2003). 
Market prices for seasonal allocations vary spatially between irrigation districts and 
temporally within and between irrigation seasons. Within a season, prices for 
allocation trades vary due to (among other things) the effect of weather conditions 
on demand for water, and the effect on storage levels. For example, reflecting the 
scarcity of water due to drought conditions in northern Victoria, allocation trade 
prices in the Greater Goulburn trade region of the Goulburn–Murray irrigation 
scheme reached historic highs of around $500 per megalitre between October 2002 
and January 2003 (figure A.1). 
Figure A.1  Pool price of allocations traded in the Goulburn–Murray 

























a 1a and 1b Greater Goulburn Trading zones. b Gaps in time series indicates periods of no trade (primarily 
between irrigation seasons).  
Sources: Peterson et al. 2004; Watermove database.  
Trade in entitlements 
The majority of the net trade in entitlements tends to occur within, rather than 
between, trading areas (DNRE 2001; Bjornlund 2003. For example, in Victoria, the 
volume of entitlements traded has increased gradually since trading commenced in      




1990, although it remains significantly less than the volume of trade in allocations. 
Between 1990-91 and 2000-01, a volume equal to 6 per cent of the total entitlement 
of farmers in Victoria was permanently transferred.  
Administrative restrictions explicitly limit the trade of entitlements between regions 
and across State borders in the southern Murray–Darling Basin. For example, water 
authorities in Victoria can refuse ‘out of area’ transfers of entitlements if annual net 
transfers out of an area exceed two per cent of water rights in that area, this is 
proposed to be increased to four per cent for all irrigation districts in the southern 
Murray–Darling Basin by 1 July 2006 (DSE 2006). 
These restrictions are likely to alter as utilities across the southern Murray–Darling 
Basin seek to establish exit fees for transfers of entitlements outside of their service 
area. 
Due to the relatively thin market and confidential nature of many of the trades of 
entitlements, there is little publicly available information about the prices being paid 
for entitlements. However, the former Victorian Department of Natural Resources 
and the Environment (DNRE 2001) noted that the trend in prices has been generally 
upward. In 1994, 12 000 megalitres of Sunraysia water was sold at auction for about 
$440 per megalitre, mainly to Sunraysia buyers. By 1998-99, prices of over 
$800 per megalitre were paid in the Goulburn–Murray region (reflecting, among 
other factors, drought and the setting of the 1994 Cap on the volume of water that 
could be taken from the river systems in the Murray–Darling Basin). In 1999-00, 
Sunraysia prices reached $1000 per megalitre. 
Some information on trade in entitlements is also available from the   
Murray–Darling Basin Commission’s Pilot Interstate Trading Water Project, which 
has been in operation since 1998. Although the volumes represented by the scheme 
are quite low — about 19 gigalitres of total trade between September 1998 and 
February 2004 — it is possible to observe traded prices for entitlements in several 
regions. Young, Dyer and Thoms (2001) indicate that, through the scheme, 
entitlements have traded at prices around $500 per megalitre in the Riverland 
(South Australia), $730 to $1000 per megalitre in Sunraysia, and $1000 per 
megalitre in New South Wales.  
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